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     THE LAWS OF IMAGE  
 
Samantha Barbas* 
 
 
We live in an image society. Since the turn of the 20th century if not 
earlier, Americans have been awash in a sea of images – in advertisements, 
in newspapers and magazines, on billboards, throughout the visual 
landscape. We are highly attuned to looks, first impressions and surface 
appearances, and perhaps no image is more seductive to us than our own 
personal image. In 1962, the cultural historian Daniel Boorstin observed 
that when people talked about themselves, they talked about their images.1 
If the flourishing industries of image management -- fashion, cosmetics, 
self-help -- are any indication, we are indeed deeply concerned with our 
looks, reputations, and the impressions that we make. For over a hundred 
years, social relations and conceptions of personal identity have revolved 
around the creation, projection, and manipulation of images.2  
The rise of the image society has been a familiar subject of 
commentary in the fields of social and cultural history,3 yet its legal 
implications have not been explored or understood. This is unfortunate, as 
the law has been foundational to the image society; legal doctrines and 
institutions facilitated the culture of images and were in turn altered and 
shaped by it. In what follows, I want to contemplate one legal consequence 
of the advent of the image society: the evolution of an area of law that I 
describe as the tort law of personal image. By the 1950s, a body of tort law 
– principally the privacy, defamation, publicity, and emotional distress 
torts4 -- had developed to protect a right to control one’s own image, and to 
                                                
* Associate Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo; J.D. Stanford Law School, Ph.D., 
History, University of California Berkeley.  
1DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA  (1961).  
2 Susan Sontag has written that a society becomes “modern when one of its chief 
activities is producing and consuming images, when images have extraordinary powers to 
determine our demands upon reality and are themselves coveted substitutes for firsthand 
experience and become indispensable to the health of the economy, the stability of the 
polity, and the pursuit of private happiness.” ON PHOTOGRAPHY 153 (1978).  
3 See e.g., BOORSTIN, supra; STUART EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLITICS 
OF STYLE IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE (1990); STUART EWEN AND ELIZABETH EWEN, 
CHANNELS OF DESIRE: MASS IMAGES AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS 
(1992); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1978); T.J. JACKSON LEARS, 
FABLES OF ABUNDANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICA (1995); 
PETER STEARNS, AMERICAN COOL, infra.   
4 The legal action for defamation is not a modern tort, but as this article suggests, the 
20th century version of the tort is significantly different from what preceded it. Defamation 
law has come to protect not only “reputation” but personal image and one’s feelings about 
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be compensated for emotional and dignitary harms caused by egregious and 
unwarranted interference with one’s self-presentation and public identity.5 
The law of image gave rise to the phenomenon of the personal image 
lawsuit, in which individuals sued to vindicate or redress their image rights. 
By the postwar era, such lawsuits had become an established feature of the 
sociolegal landscape, occupying not only a prominent place on court 
dockets but also in the popular imagination. The growth in personal image 
litigation over the course of the 20th century was driven by Americans’ 
increasing sense of entitlement to their personal images. A confluence of 
social forces led individuals to cultivate a sense of possessiveness and 
protectiveness towards their images, which was legitimated and enhanced 
by the law.  
This article offers a broad overview of the development of the 
modern “image torts” and the phenomenon of personal image litigation. An 
intertwined history of the law, culture, and the self, it explores how the law 
became a stage for, and participant in, the modern preoccupation with 
personal image, and how tort law’s models of personhood and identity in 
turn transformed understandings of the self. Through legal claims for libel, 
invasions of privacy, and other assaults to the image, the law was brought, 
both practically and imaginatively, into popular fantasies and struggles over 
personal identity and self-presentation.   
Throughout the article, I refer to the concept of image – public 
image or personal image. Although the term “reputation” is familiar in the 
law, it is inadequate to describe the nature of the interests at stake in many 
legal disputes over invasion of privacy, unwanted publicity, and 
defamation. Reputation, a mode of social evaluation historically associated 
with stable and enduring communities, is based on appraisals and judgments 
accrued over time.6 Image, by contrast, is the representation of self that one 
                                                                                                                       
one’s image.  
5 In describing these as “image torts” rather than “personality torts,” as they are 
traditionally categorized, this article offers a reclassification and reconceptualization of this 
area of tort law, one that suggests an alternative view of the protected interests at stake. For 
classifications of the defamation and privacy law as protecting “rights of personality,” see 
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); 
Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460 (1934); Roscoe Pound, Interests of 
Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 363-64 (1915); Paul M. Schwartz, Karl-Nikolas Peifer, 
Privacy and the German Right of Personality, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1925, 1943-46 (2010); 
Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).    
6 See, e.g., R. Zinko, G. Ferris, F. Blass, and M. Laird, Toward a Theory of Reputation 
in Organizations in 26 RESEARCH IN PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
4 (2007). “Reputation is a perceptual identity formed from the collective perceptions of 
others, which is reflective of the complex combination of salient personal characteristics 
and accomplishments, demonstrated behavior, and intended images presented over some 
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constructs and presents in a world defined by mobility and relatively 
transient social relations: the fleeting contacts of the city, the momentary 
connections of the world wide web. When a person is depicted in the media 
in an embarrassing manner, she may be worried about her reputation among 
her peers, but she is also likely concerned with her image: the undesirable 
impression she has made on a mass audience, albeit faceless and unknown 
to her. She may resent not only that she has been portrayed negatively, but 
even more, the fact that she has lost control of her public image. The mass 
media have been regarded as one of the primary threats to personal image in 
modern times, and this article focuses on cases brought against media 
defendants. In these cases, the principle that one has a right to control one’s 
own image -- to be the primary author of one’s image -- was written, albeit 
with qualifications, into tort law.  
The story of the modern tort law of image begins in the late 1800s, 
when new technologies of visual representation and the fragmented and 
unstable nature of interpersonal relations in the city generated new anxieties 
around image, identity, and self-presentation in public. In an environment 
characterized by fleeting encounters with strangers, where the mass media 
was beginning to assume a central place in social life, appearances, first 
impressions and images became matters of great individual and collective 
significance. It was in this milieu that courts and legal theorists began to 
discuss the possibility of a legal right to privacy. Although the right to 
privacy is often described as a “right to be let alone,” privacy was primarily 
understood, in the legal and popular discourse of the time, as a right to 
control one’s public image and to be compensated for the dignitary harms 
caused by unwanted and undesirable publicity. As Part One explains, the 
privacy tort was the legal manifestation of a nascent appearance-conscious, 
image-conscious culture. 
 The further development of the visual mass media, the rise of a 
consumer culture in the early 20th century, and the transitory nature of 
modern social relations heightened the cultural emphasis on personal image 
and the act of image-making. As individuals were unmoored from social 
institutions that had traditionally anchored personal identity, they conceived 
of themselves increasingly in terms of images and manufactured 
appearances. One’s identity came to be seen as congruent with the 
impressions and images one projected to the world, and the ability to 
control these surface representations regarded as essential to personal 
                                                                                                                       
period of time as observed directly and/or reported from secondary sources, which reduces 
ambiguity about expected future behavior.” For other definitions of reputation, particularly 
as they bear on defamation law, see Post, supra at 693-715; David S. Ardia, Reputation in 
a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 261, 267-272 (2010).   
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autonomy and self-definition. The 1930s and 40s saw the doctrinal 
expansion of the image torts and the rise of the personal image lawsuit -- a 
legal action, typically for invasion of privacy or defamation, often brought 
against the mass media. The harm alleged was that one’s feelings and 
dignity were injured when the media interfered with her perceived right to 
fashion her own public persona. As Part Two explains, by the 1950s, tort 
law had come to be regarded by many as a tool in the all-important project 
of image management.  
Part Three describes the flourishing of the image society in the latter 
twentieth century, and the near-obsession with personal image that has been 
a defining feature of the recent American social experience. It tracks the rise 
of what of sociologists and critics have described an “other-directed” self – 
a modal personality type, ubiquitous in the affluent culture of postwar 
America, that was consumed with personal image and the act of 
constructing a pleasing public facade. In a highly individualistic society, 
one influenced by the ideals of psychotherapy and consumerism, the ability 
to freely shape one’s own public persona, to “express oneself” through 
one’s public appearance, and to maximize one’s success by transforming 
one’s image were bound up with prevailing ideals of self-fulfillment, self-
enhancement, and freedom of choice. Personal image litigation increased in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, as did the variety of legal pathways 
available to vindicate harms to one’s image, including a family of privacy 
torts, a “right of publicity,” and an independent tort action for emotional 
distress. The deeper Americans’ investment in their images, and the greater 
the perceived threats to personal image, the more instinctive the resort to the 
law to protect them. Freedom of speech notwithstanding, we remain 
committed to the idea that interference with one’s public image can, under 
many circumstances, violate important rights of personhood. 
In describing this body of law as image torts, I do not want to 
suggest that the parties who made use of them were concerned only with 
their images. Many of the kinds of mass media misrepresentations that we 
will see produced feelings of shock, hurt and outrage that can be rightly 
understood as more than merely an interest in how one appeared to others. 
Yet in many cases, it is clear that what drove these feelings of personal 
insult and violation was a sense of image-consciousness. Defamations, 
embarrassing publications of private facts, and false representations before 
the public can and often do produce serious emotional and psychic injuries; 
they do so, in part, because we have put so much weight on our public 
images and freighted them with intense personal meaning and import.  
I realize that some may take issue with my characterization of 
American law as especially solicitous of personal image. As many have 
pointed out, American privacy and defamation laws, limited by the First 
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Amendment, do not protect the right to one’s image as extensively as in 
other parts of the world, particularly continental Europe.7 It is true that 
image laws in the United States have been substantially constrained by 
freedom of speech. These limitations represent another dimension, perhaps 
the flip side, of modern image consciousness. In a culture where images 
have been the currency of social exchange, where politics and social life 
have been mediated by images, the ability to freely disseminate images of 
individuals and public affairs has been linked to the “free and robust” public 
discussion said to be at the core of the First Amendment’s domain. The 
ideal of modern expressive freedom has cut both ways: it is the prerogative 
to express oneself through one’s image, and at the same time, the freedom 
to image others. The history of American image law is thus a saga of 
simultaneous expansion and contraction – the greater recognition of 
personal image rights and at the same time, their restriction. Much of the 
legal scholarship in this area has focused on the latter.8 This piece 
investigates the expansionary trend and suggests why we have a law of 
image in the first place.  
 
I. PERSONAL IMAGE AND THE LAW, 1880-1920 
 
The tort law of image traces its origins to the drama, tension and 
uncertainty of social relations in the American cities of the late 1800s. It 
was in this milieu of intensifying concerns with image and self-presentation 
in public that the tort “right to privacy” was conceived and took root. In its 
broadest terms, the right to privacy was described as the right to control 
one’s public image, “to exhibit [oneself] to the public at all proper times, in 
all proper places, and in a proper manner.”9 Public image was becoming not 
only an increasing preoccupation of Americans of all backgrounds, but 
legalized, in the sense that people came to regard their public appearances 
                                                
7 See, e.g., ROBIN BARNES, OUTRAGEOUS INVASIONS: CELEBRITIES’ PRIVATE LIVES, 
MEDIA, AND THE LAW (2009); NEW DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson, eds., 2006); 
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
YALE L.J. 1151 (2004). 
8 See, e.g, Post, supra; Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the 
“Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191 (1964); NORMAN 
ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF 
LIBEL 235-58 (1995); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Privacy: The Light That 
Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364 (1989); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Requiem for a 
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 
291 (1983); Peter L. Felcher and Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of 
Real People in the Media, 88 YALE L. J. 1577 (1978); Rodney Smolla, Emotional Distress 
and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 423 (1988). 
9Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
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and reputations not only as matters of social contestation and negotiation, 
but as proper subjects for legal involvement and intervention.  
 
A. Image Consciousness  
In the mid to late 19th century, the major American cities, driven by 
industrialization and immigration, grew exponentially. In 1840, about 11 
percent of the population lived in towns and cities of more than 2500 
inhabitants; by 1860 that had jumped to nearly 20 percent. Between 1860 
and 1910, America’s urban population increased sevenfold.10 Freed from 
their backgrounds and the weight of custom and tradition, newcomers to the 
city faced the prospect of constructing entirely new lives, social identities, 
and reputations.  
The opportunity to transform one’s fate by recreating one’s 
reputation was often described as the marrow of the fabled American 
dream, the ideal of self-transformation and self-determination that had been 
held out since the nation’s founding as its particular merit and virtue. In a 
democratic society, where “rank and status were fluid, flexible, and 
changeable,” the ability to chart one’s own course in life by fashioning a 
favorable reputation was regarded, at least in theory, as every person’s 
birthright.11 As Robert Post has observed, one of the enduring faiths of 
modern market societies has been the belief that one is capable of making 
and remaking his reputation; that one “always retains a capacity to work 
towards the production of a new reputation.”12 The idealized “self-made 
man” achieved success by cultivating a reputation for honesty and 
trustworthiness, and the reward was the confidence of potential business 
relations and the respect of one’s peers.13  
Reputation had been historically understood as a personal asset 
achieved or accrued over time, “slowly built up by integrity, honorable 
conduct, and right living.”14 It was a form of social appraisal particularly 
suited to stable and enduring communities where individuals were in 
repeated and continuous contact.15 As a New York appeals court explained 
                                                
10 JOHN KASSON, RUDENESS AND CIVILITY: MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
URBAN AMERICA, 70-72 (1991).  
11 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 
24, 27 (1990).  
12 Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation, Reputation and the 
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 695-6 (1986).  
13See generally JOHN CAWELTI, APOSTLES OF THE SELF-MADE MAN (1968).     
14 Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 COLUM. 
L. REV. 33 (1904).  
15 See David Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 747, 766 (1983). “Public image bears little relationship to the interests envisioned by 
the courts when defamation law was evolving. In that era, reputation represented the 
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in 1845 in Cooper v. Greely & McElrath, a “reputation of a person is the 
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place he is known.”16 One 
cannot have a reputation where one is unknown. In cities of recent 
transplants, where social life consisted of frequent interaction with 
strangers, first impressions, perhaps even more than reputations, were 
becoming an important foundation of social evaluation and judgment. As 
historian John Kasson has written, in “the pluralistic world of the 19th 
century commercial metropolis,” the immediate impressions people made 
upon each other were coming to be seen as “the very basis of social 
existence.”17  
From these transitory and unstable urban social relations emerged a 
new kind of self-conciousness and a heightened sensitivity to one’s image 
before the public.18 There was increased attention to the presentation of self 
in everyday life, and a more urgent self-scrutiny, one that “fed upon 
uncertainties of status, of belonging, of living up to ambiguous standards” 
of social conduct in an environment “in which all claims of rank were 
subject to challenge,” in Kasson’s words.19 Popular advice literature 
encouraged readers to create favorable images and impressions that could 
be conveyed to others through quick and insignificant contact.20 One was to 
adopt an external perspective on one’s self, to consider at all times how one 
might appear in the eyes of strangers, and dress, gait, speech, and gestures 
were to be monitored with great care and carefully manipulated in order to 
impress one’s peers and achieve social advancement.21  
This attentiveness to personal image and self-presentation in public was 
enhanced by the development and widespread use of new visual 
technologies. The period between 1885 and 1910 has been described by 
historians as a “visual revolution” – the generation of Americans living in 
this period “went through an experience of visual reorientation that had few 
earlier precedents,” according to historian Neil Harris.22 Billboards, first 
                                                                                                                       
esteem of a person earned, through the daily conduct of his affairs, in the eyes of those who 
knew him.”    
16 Cooper v. Greely & McElrath, 1 Denio 347 (1845). 
17 KASSON, supra at 114.  
18 Image is distinct from reputation and also from honor, a system of social 
stratification in traditional societies that is dependent on the existence of fixed classes and 
rigid social hierarchies. On the meaning of honor, see Post supra at 725; FRIEDMAN supra 
at 41; BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD 
SOUTH (1982).  
19KASSON, supra at 180.  
20 Id., Chapters Four and Five.   
21See KAREN HALTUNNEN, CONFIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED WOMEN: A STUDY OF 
MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA , 1830-1870, 93 (1986).   
22 NEIL HARRIS, CULTURAL EXCURSIONS: MARKETING APPETITES AND CULTURAL 
TASTES IN MODERN AMERICA, 307. 
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used in the  mid-1800s, came to scatter the urban environment.23 The 
development of chromolithography and halftone printing led to the 
proliferation of visual images in the press.24 Portrait and Kodak 
photography were coming into wide use, and Americans had become 
familiar with the experience of posing for photos and seeing themselves in 
terms of the visual impressions they made on others.25  
By the late 19th century, middle and upper-class urban dwellers were 
being encouraged to cultivate an attitude towards their bodies, appearances, 
and feelings that was strategic and instrumental.26 As historian Charles 
Ponce DeLeon has written, “the residents of cities in the United States…had 
concluded that everyone employed ‘fronts’ when in public, [and] that all 
self-presentation was, to one degree or another … artificial.”27 The 
potentially deceptive nature of self-presentation was the subject of great 
anxiety, and to assuage these fears, social performance was often 
rationalized in terms of moral objectives. The goal of the idealized social 
performance was not to mislead, it was said, but rather to externalize 
personal qualities sincerely held -- industry, frugality, self-discipline, and 
deferred gratification, prized values in an industrializing economy.28 The 
virtuous person who carefully cultivated good character, and who displayed 
it in his appearance and conduct, was not presenting a false front but merely 
displaying his true inner nature.29 This “character” ideal was gendered, and 
special burdens were placed on women, who were to convey the signs of 
sexual virtue through their dress, speech, and expressions.30  
                                                
23  See Id. at 419.  
24 See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 157 (1993).   
25 On the history of photography in the United States in the 19th century, see Alan 
Trachtenberg, READING AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHS: IMAGES AS HISTORY (1990); Robert 
Mensel, Kodakers Lying in Wait: Amateur Photography and the Right of Privacy in New 
York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 28 (1991).  
26 On 19th century advice books and etiquette literature, see generally KASSON, supra; 
HALTUNNEN, supra. Though these exacting and self-conscious standards of decorum are 
most often associated with the middle and upper classes, historical evidence suggests that 
Americans of all classes, particularly the aspiring middle-class, followed this ethic of 
intense self-monitoring and polite self-restraint. See T.J. JACKSON LEARS, NO PLACE OF 
GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 1880-1920, 
15 (1994). 
    27 CHARLES PONCE DE LEON, SELF-EXPOSURE: HUMAN INTEREST JOURNALISM AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF CELEBRITY IN AMERICA 1890-1940, 29 (2002).  
28 See Warren Susman, Personality and the Making of Twentieth Century Culture, in 
CULTURE AS HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 273-4 (1984).  
29 The outward display of inner virtue was seen as “an integral part of character itself.” 
HALTUNNEN, supra. 
30 See Kasson, supra at 128-132.   
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The demands of the “genteel performance” were exacting. They 
required not only close attention to one’s looks and conduct but also to the 
intricacies of context and setting.31 Being socially skilled meant calibrating 
one’s behavior to meet the demands of different audiences and situations. 
Conduct before one’s family was inappropriate before houseguests, and 
behavior suitable for one’s parlor was not to be shared with strangers.32 One 
of the most grievous social gaffes was to present oneself out of context, in a 
manner unsuited to a given social environment.33 In these rituals of public 
performance, “privacy” assumed particular importance.  
 
2. The origins of the right to privacy 
By the 1880s, a “right to privacy” was beginning to be discussed in 
popular, scholarly, and legal literature. Although the concept of “privacy” 
was, as it remains, laden with an array of meanings and connotations, in the 
late 19th century it was bound up with the culture of the image and the 
intensifying demands of self-presentation in public. At the time it made its 
debut in American law, “the right to privacy” was largely understood as a 
right to protect one’s public image by concealing embarrassing, personal or 
“private” matters from public view.34 The domain of the “private” swept 
broadly. It encompassed not only one’s home and family life, but also 
matters pertaining to one’s body, physical functions and emotions.35 The 
dignified person was respectably modest and “pained and distressed by 
anything resembling publicity” of his personal affairs.36 A “sure mark of 
good breeding,” one advice manual summarized, was the suppression in 
public of “any undue emotion, such as anger, mortification, or laughter.”37  
 With its ability to expose individuals and their personal affairs to a mass 
audience in ways that were undignified and humiliating, the popular press 
                                                
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33KASSON, supra at 93.  
34 See, e.g., Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890); E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen IV – To His Own Reputation, 
SCRIBNER’S 58 (July 1890).   
35 19th century society perceived a strict division between public and private “spheres” 
of life. The sanctity of the private household was regarded as a refuge from the world of the 
aggressive marketplace; in the home, one could cultivate close relationships and express 
intense and spontaneous feelings proscribed in the formal, judgmental realm of the public. 
This segmentation of society was mirrored by a segmentation of self. There was a public 
self and a private self, each attuned to the demands of its respective sphere. Only in the 
private sphere could one let down one’s guard and display one’s emotions and “true self.” 
See HALTUNNEN, supra at 104; KASSON, supra at 61, 116 (1991); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE 
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN DAILY LIFE (1959). 
36 The Right of Privacy, N. Y. TIMES, July 3, 1902.  
37 KASSON, supra at 180.  
10 The Laws of Image  
was coming to be described as the primary threat to privacy in 
contemporary social life.38 The “penny press” of the 1830s and 40s, and its 
successor, the sensationalistic yellow press of the late 19th century, 
developed the genre of human interest journalism, which focused on true 
stories and private lives.39 The penny papers initiated society and gossip 
columns, which allowed readers to peer in on “private houses…banquets, 
balls, [and] teas.”40 The mid-1800s saw the beginning of the widespread use 
of the personal interview in reporting on public figures, interviews that were 
said to enable readers to “get behind the veil with which everyone attempts 
to conceal his innermost thoughts and feelings.”41 By the end of the century, 
most papers ran gossip columns on politicians, businessmen, society 
leaders, and actors that offered readers a glimpse of their private lives and 
an appraisal of the subject’s intimate “personality” and “habits.”42 This 
focus on the private and the personal helped make popular journalism a 
mass fascination and pastime. 43 There was great public curiosity not only 
about the rich and famous but also the private lives of ordinary people.44 
Publishers catered to this interest by excavating and displaying the personal 
affairs of average citizens.45 The front pages of the papers featured divorce 
cases, stories of secret affairs, crimes of passion, and the stories of men and 
                                                
38 HAZEL DICKEN GARCIA, JOURNALISTIC STANDARDS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY 
AMERICA, 200-201 (1989).  
39 HELEN MCGILL HUGHES, NEWS AND THE HUMAN INTEREST STORY: A STUDY OF 
POPULAR LITERATURE (1940). The 19th century popular press “methodically violated” the 
private sphere, writes historian Gunther Barth, and in so doing, “steadily broadened 
people’s idea of what was news.” GUNTHER BARTH, CITY PEOPLE: THE RISE OF MODERN 
CITY CULTURE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 72 (1982). 
40 G.T. Rider, The Pretensions of Journalism, 135 N. AMER. REV. 489 (1882).  In 1861 
the New York Herald committed a “journalistic first” when it assigned a reporter to write 
about President Lincoln’s family and home life. JANNA MALAMUD SMITH, PRIVATE 
MATTERS: IN DEFENSE OF THE PERSONAL LIFE 179 (1997).  
41 PONCE DE LEON, supra at 57.  
42“Please impress upon the men who write our interviews with prominent men the 
importance of giving a striking, vivid pen sketch of the subject; also a vivid picture of the 
domestic environment, his wife, his children, his animal pets, etc,” publisher Joseph 
Pulitzer told his writers in the 1880s.  Quoted in FRED INGLIS, A SHORT HISTORY OF 
CELEBRITY 125 (2010).  
43 This is one way that American publishing was different from its European 
counterparts, which tended to focus on the private lives of elites. While the point of the 
continental scandal sheets was to take down the wealthy and powerful by exposing their 
private misdeeds and hypocrisies, the focus in the American press on average citizens’ 
private lives and public selves was intended to aid readers in the construction of an 
“American identity.” See MITCHELL STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF NEWS (2007); BARTH, supra 
at 106-108.  
44 Between 1870 and 1900, the readership of daily urban newspapers increased 400%. 
PEMBER, supra at 10. 
45 See BARTH, supra at 106.  
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women lost in the “shuffle of daily life.”46  
  With its promise to go “behind the scenes,” to allow readers to see 
whether individuals were the same in private life as in public, mass 
journalism played to the public’s interest in the instability and malleability 
of social identity and the constructed nature of public images. The more that 
personal identity was seen in terms of the presentation of facades and 
“fronts,” the greater the public’s interest in deconstructing other people’s 
fronts.47 The popular media became, in effect, an industry of counterimage.  
It was in this milieu of intensifying concerns with image, and threats 
to public image, that the foundations of the modern tort law of image were 
established. The opening chapter in this story involved the effort of courts 
and legal scholars in the late 19th century to theorize and implement a 
legally enforceable “right to privacy.” In an 1880 essay, critic and New York 
Post editor E.L. Godkin called for a revision of libel law to protect “the 
right of every man to keep his affairs to himself, and to decide for himself 
to what extent they shall be the subject of public observation and 
discussion.”48 In an article in Scribner’s magazine ten years later, he 
advocated a “right to privacy,” distinct from libel, which he described as the 
individual’s right to “decid[e] how much or how little the community shall 
see of him, or know of him.”49 The right to privacy was “the right to decide 
how much knowledge of …personal thought and feeling, and how much 
knowledge…of tastes and habits, of his own private doings and affairs…the 
public at large shall have.”50 This was “as much one of [one’s] natural 
rights as his right to decide how he shall eat and drink, what he shall wear, 
and in what manner he shall pass his leisure hours.”51 
  Godkin’s piece inspired the writing, later that year, of the famous 
                                                
46 Id. 
47 The public’s fascination with the potential instability of appearances found 
expression in the art, literature, and popular culture of the time. Stories about “confidence 
men,” undercover detectives, and others who dealt in disguises revealed the ways that 
social appearances were potentially subject to manipulation. Stunt reporters became 
famous for the guises they took on to do undercover journalism, and the newspapers were 
filled with the details of masked balls, costume parties, and other plays on identity. See 
KASSON, supra at 105-109; BARTH, supra at 74, 107 
48 E.L. Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 729, 736 (Dec. 
1880). Godkin was a noted popularizer of legal ideas and an advocate, well ahead of his 
time, of legal protection of the emotions, “privacy,” and personal image. On Godkin see 
William Armstrong, E.L. GODKIN: A BIOGRAPHY (1978). 
49 Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, supra at 65.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. According to Godkin, curiosity “in its modern form, published gossip, was the 
chief enemy” of privacy in contemporary life. Id. at 66. See also ROCHELLE GURSTEIN, 
REPEAL OF RETICENCE: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S CULTURAL AND LEGAL STRUGGLES 
OVER FREE SPEECH, OBSCENITY, SEXUAL LIBERATION, AND MODERN ART 37, 57 (1998). 
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article “The Right to Privacy,” the Harvard Law Review piece by Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis that is credited with originating the legal right 
to privacy.52 An attack on the popular press, the article decried gossip 
columns and information about personal affairs “spread broadcast in the 
columns of the daily papers.”53 Warren and Brandeis accused the press of 
invading privacy when it displayed a person’s emotions and idiosyncrasies 
–“peculiarities of manner and person” – before a public audience.54 
Newspapers invaded privacy when they published a person’s photograph, 
unauthorized, even if it was taken in a public place,55 and when they 
publicized, without consent, one’s participation in social events, such as 
weddings or dinner parties.56 The picture of a woman as she walked down 
the street technically was not “private,” nor was the fact of her attendance at 
a ball or a banquet. Such disclosures nonetheless were said to “invade 
privacy” because, in depicting the subject before an unwanted mass 
audience, they interfered with her prerogative to present herself in an 
appropriate and desirable manner and context. The right to privacy was both 
the right to keep one’s “private” affairs out of the public eye, and more 
broadly, to prevent egregious and unwarranted interference with one’s 
public image. It was, as the Georgia Supreme Court described it 15 years 
later, the right “to exhibit [oneself] to the public at all proper times, in all 
proper places, and in a proper manner.”57  
  The article proposed a cause of action that would allow the victims of 
“invasions of privacy” to sue in tort and recover damages for dignitary and 
emotional injuries. The thrust of the legal argument was that a right to 
privacy as a right to control one’s image already existed in the common 
law. The existing legal protection of artistic expression demonstrated that 
“the common law secures to each individual the right of determining, 
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be 
communicated to others.”58 The press had no more right to interfere with a 
person’s public image without consent than it did to misappropriate a 
                                                
52 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
53 Id. at 196.  
54 Id. at 215.  
55 See Id. at 195 (discussing the case of Manola v. Stevens & Myers).  
56 The catalyst for the article was Warren’s outrage that a Boston newspaper published 
an account of his niece’s wedding. See PEMBER, supra at Chapter Two. See also Amy 
Gajda, What if Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering the 
Press Coverage That Led to “The Right to Privacy,” 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 55-58 
(2008).  
57Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
58Id. at 198.  
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painting, lithograph, or other artistic image.59 Under the proposed privacy 
tort, damages could be recovered for “injury to feelings.”60 This proposition 
was novel and contested at the time; the common law did not recognize the 
interest in one’s peace of mind as deserving of general and independent 
legal protection, and compensation for emotional harms was usually 
parasitic upon a cause of action for the violation of some other legal right.61  
  Libel law, which imposed liability for defamatory falsehoods, 
protected a different interest from the right to privacy -- in one’s reputation, 
the esteem in which one was held by others.62 The right to privacy, by 
contrast, proscribed embarrassing but truthful information and implicated an 
interest that was personal and “spiritual,” according to Warren and 
Brandeis.63 It did not protect one’s standing before others so much as a 
person’s feelings about her public image, and her capacity to independently 
determine her own image. Liability could not be had for every interference 
with self-presentation, Warren and Brandeis had written; the law of privacy 
was not to be a remedy for back fence gossip or trivial slights. Only 
material that was distributed to a wide public audience, that was published 
solely for the purpose of amusement or curiosity, and that was “flagrant” in 
its disregard of standards of social decency would be actionable under the 
privacy tort.64 
   As protection for freedom of the press, Warren and Brandeis 
envisioned a privilege for “matters of public interest,” which exempted 
from liability the publication of private information justified by an 
overriding public need. The privilege was narrow and to be limited only to 
certain publications involving public figures, such as the limited discussion 
of the personal qualities of a public official that bore on his fitness for 
office.65 At a time when the reigning judicial position on free speech was 
far more deferential towards state-imposed restrictions on speech and 
publishing than in the post-1930s, civil libertarian era, jurists and legal 
                                                
59Id. at 206. 
60 Id. at 219.  
61Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. 
L. REV. 1033, 1035, 1048 (1935). 
62 Warren and Brandeis, supra at 197. In the history of defamation law, reputation had 
been regarded as having material value and as a form of property. Robert Post has observed 
that the concept of reputation as property was so deeply entrenched that a prominent 19th 
century writer could conclude that in defamation law, the “protection is to … property” and 
“pecuniary loss to the plaintiff is the gist of the action for libel or slander.” Post, supra at 
696; see also Randall Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 538 
(1988). 
63“The wrongs and correlative rights recognized by the law of libel and slander are in 
their nature material rather than spiritual.” Warren and Brandeis, supra at 196. 
    64 Id. at 216.  
65 Id. at 214. 
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scholars generally agreed that the privacy tort, with this narrow public 
interest exception, did not encroach on the constitutional freedoms of 
speech and press.66 
Warren and Brandeis described the prerogative to establish and 
control one’s own public image without interference from a prying, 
sensationalistic press as essential to personal dignity. The concept of 
dignity, a “key cultural trait of the northern states”67 in this time, held that 
in theory, every person had “intrinsic value” and an equivalent right to self-
determination.68 Every person had a privacy right “whatsoever…their 
position or station,” Warren and Brandeis had written.69 Continental Europe 
had developed legal protections for privacy and personal image as dignitary 
rights, and Warren and Brandeis cited these favorably in the article.70 In the 
mid-19th century, Germany had developed a right to privacy, understood as 
a right to one’s image, as part of a broader body of “personality” rights.71 
The German right to privacy rested on the principle that each person has a 
unique soul or essence, and that the ability to freely express one’s inner self 
through one’s appearance and public image is fundamental to self-
realization.72 Similar strains of expressive individualism had been present in 
the United States in a 19th century Romantic tradition, and “The Right to 
Privacy” reflected their influence.73 
Warren and Brandeis characterized privacy’s domain as the 
emotions and the spirit; privacy was the freedom to express one’s self as 
                                                
66 In the words of the Virginia Law Review, freedom of the press “was not intended to 
confer a license, without any limitation, to override the rights of others,” including “the 
right to be left alone.” The Right to Privacy, VA. L. REV. 92 (1906); Pavesich v. New 
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).  
67 FRIEDMAN, supra at 41.  
68 Id. See also EDWARD AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 19 (1984). “Legal enforcement of the right to 
privacy” would operate as a “practical means by which an individual could exercise his or 
her inherent right of individual self-determination.” Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of 
the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 22 (1979).  
69 Id. at 195.  
70 By the 1870s, France had developed a right to one’s image, which forbade the 
publication in periodicals of “anything relating to a man’s private life which is not … 
before the courts in a criminal proceeding.” The right to one’s image was an important 
aspect of the “right to privacy” in France, and it was mobilized by aristocrats and other 
high status persons seeking to keep their family and personal affairs from public view. See 
Elbridge Adams, The Right of Privacy and its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. L. REG. 
37, 52 (1905).  
71 Whitman, supra at 1178-9. 
72 Id.  
    73On “expressive individualism” in 19th century America, see R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, 
W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPSON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 32-33 (1985).  
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one wished, a self that was immanent in one’s appearance.74 Yet the right to 
privacy, particularly as it came to be understood by the public, had a more 
earthly, strategic and instrumental aspect. Particularly in the late 19th 
century, a time of aggressive Gilded Age individualism, success was 
understood as a function of individual will, initiative and effort.75 This 
included creating and putting forth the best possible personal image, 
whether deceptive or authentic.76 Public misrepresentation robbed one of 
one’s perceived right, in a nation of opportunity and mobility, to determine 
his own fate and maximize his fortunes by perfecting his image before 
others. The success of the right to privacy, both as a popular concept and as 
a matter of formal law, was rooted in practical and material concerns with 
image in American social life and popular culture.77   
 
3. Litigating the image 
  Following the publication of the highly influential Warren and 
Brandeis article, a series of cases were brought in state courts over alleged 
“invasions of privacy.” In many of the cases, the aggrieved individual did 
not allege that an intimate or “private” matter had been exposed to public 
view, but rather that she had been depicted in a publication in an 
undesirable or misleading context that contradicted the way she wanted to 
be known to others.78 This injury to her ability to control her public image, 
and to her feelings about her image, was said to be a violation of her “right 
to privacy.” 
  In these privacy cases, and also libel cases from this period, we can 
detect the origins of a possessiveness towards one’s image -- an entitlement 
to one’s image – that would intensify over subsequent decades. Social 
elites, as well as politicians, actors, and other public figures who depended 
                                                
74 See generally Sennett, supra.   
75 See generally CAWELTI, supra. On the “utilitarian individualism” that has long 
defined the American tradition – the idea that one can achieve social and material success 
largely by one’s own initiative – see BELLAH, supra at 33. 
76 As John Cawelti has observed, “by the end of the 19th century self-help books were 
dominated by [an] ethos of salesmanship and boosterism” that linked success to a positive 
public image. CAWELTI quoted in LASCH, supra at 58. 
77 See Glancy, supra at 7, noting popular support in the late 19th century for a right to 
privacy. As Benjamin Bratman writes, it “seems beyond dispute that at the dawn of the 
twentieth century, the American legal community and the lay public zealously supported 
the enactment of legal protection for their privacy.” Benjamin C. Bratman, Brandeis and 
Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L REV. 623, 
650 (2002).  
78 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Foster-Millburn Co. 
v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909), appeal after remand, 127 S.W. 476 (Ky. 1910); 
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 450 (N.Y. 1902); Marks v. Jaffa, 6 
Misc. 290 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1893);  
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on public favor for their livelihoods, had long been concerned with their 
images and reputations.79 Yet the majority of reported privacy and libel 
claims in the late 19th and early 20th century were brought not by public 
figures but by private citizens. Ordinary men and women seemed to think 
that their public images and appearances were valuable matters worth 
protecting, and that interference with their ability to construct a desirable 
public image warranted legal redress. The legal recognition and embrace of 
this attentiveness to image, albeit yet hesitant and tentative, marked a 
turning point in the history of the law and the modern social history of the 
self. 
Many of the early privacy cases were brought over the unauthorized 
use of portraits and other visual depictions of individuals in 
advertisements.80 In the late 19th century, new printing technologies 
permitted advertising, once exclusively word-based, to become image-
based, and advertisers “went on a binge of image appropriation,” looking 
for visual impressions to “create favorable associations for their 
products.”81 Advertisers often purchased portraits from photography studios 
for use in ads, typically without the consent of the photographic subjects;82 
by 1900, there was a large market in such images.83 A photograph of one’s 
face was considered particularly intimate -- a “window into the soul,” and 
for that reason, to be especially “private.”84 The unauthorized advertising 
                                                
79 See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND 
SOCIAL CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION (2005); Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and 
Assorted Matters in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093 (2002).  
80 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Foster-
Millburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909), appeal after remand, 127 S.W. 476 (Ky. 
1910); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 450 (N.Y. 1902); Munden v. 
Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1080-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911); Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 533 
(Kan. 1918); Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 377, 384 (1899).      
81 Madow, supra at 157.   
82 On the haphazard way that newspapers of the time handled photographs, see Henry 
B. Brown, The Liberty of the Press, 34 AM. L. REV. 321, 327 (1900). (“An enterprising 
editor never allows the trivial fact that he has no photograph of a particular individual to 
prevent his publishing one. With hundreds of pictures in his collection, why should he not 
take his choice, since not one in a thousand will ever detect the fraud?”) 
83 Mensel, supra at 32. Photographic portraits were even sold from vending machines 
and given away free in cigarette packs. One late 19th century paper noted that junk shops 
peddled the “second hand stock of the cheapest …photograph parlors…pictures of bridal 
couples in full regalia…unhappy looking family groups.” Hundreds were sold to collectors 
for as cheap as a penny a piece. See also Kunz v. Bosselman, 115 N.Y. Supp. 650 (1909)  
(describing the activities of a photographic peddler in this period). 
84 Mensel, supra at 30. As an 1869 article on photographs and the law of evidence had 
explained, unlike written material, photographs were not interpretations but literal 
depictions of reality; they were natural and spoke the “truth without flattery or detraction.” 
The Legal Relations of Photographs, 17 AM. L. REG. 1, 7 (January 1869).  
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use of one’s portrait was thus considered to be an egregious invasion of 
privacy, as it put the most intimate expression of the self into a cheap and 
undignified context.85 It associated a person with what was considered to be 
the immoral taint of commercialism and created the false impression that 
one endorsed a particular product.86  
 In several cases around the turn of the century, courts recognized 
unauthorized uses of personal portraits in advertising as a dignitary harm 
redressable under a right of privacy. The 1905 Georgia case Pavesich v. 
New England Life Insurance Co., the first in which a state recognized the 
common law privacy tort, involved a photographic portrait of an artist that 
had appeared without his consent in an insurance company’s advertisement 
that was published in the Atlanta Constitution.87 The Georgia Supreme 
Court held that the artist had a cause of action for invasion of privacy. Such 
unwanted, undesirable publicity deprived him of his ability to control the 
terms of his public persona –  to display himself to the public as he wished 
and “to withdraw from the public … as [he] may see fit.”88  This injury 
represented an assault not only to his dignity but to his “liberty.”89 On this 
same theory, in 1908, a young boy’s parents sued a jewelry company over 
emotional injuries caused by the unauthorized use of his picture in an 
advertisement. The court held that he had a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy.90 Kansas’ highest court held that a woman had a valid claim for 
invasion of privacy when a dry goods store took a film of her which was 
used without her consent in a newsreel advertisement.91 In a famous New 
York case from 1902, a woman alleged invasion of privacy when her 
portrait was used in an advertisement for flour, alleging that the display of 
her picture in disreputable places such as “stores, warehouses, and saloons” 
                                                
85 See Mensel, supra at 32, noting that “many people felt a profound sense of exposure 
and violation upon being photographed, or upon finding their photographs displayed and 
sold in photo shops, or used in advertisements, without their consent.”  
86 As Neil Harris writes, in this period “photography was always associated with 
commercialization – the taint of money-making and profitable exploitation attached itself 
to this iconographic revolution.” HARRIS, supra at 308. See also Rhodes v. Sperry v. 
Hutchinson, 120 A.D. 467 (N.Y.A.D. 1907).  
87 The text of the ad made it appear, falsely, that he had consented to the publication 
and was endorsing the company’s life insurance. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 
50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905). 
88 His image, indelibly imprinted in the pages of the newspaper, could appear in 
disreputable places – saloons, brothels, and the “walls of private dwellings” – where he 
himself would never choose to appear. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70. 
89Id. at 80.  
90 Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1080-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911).   
91 The woman claimed that she had become the laughingstock and “common talk of 
the people,” since her peers assumed falsely that she was a disreputable commercial model 
and had been paid to pose for the ad. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 533 (Kan. 1918).  
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led to “mortifying notoriety,” humiliation and emotional distress.92 None of 
these plaintiffs sued over lost profits; it was considered undignified to 
attempt to make money off one’s image, and “commodification of name 
and likeness had not advanced sufficiently at the turn of the century for 
judges to conceive of the persona as ‘thing’.”93 Rather than economic 
injury, these claimants argued that advertisers had deprived them of a 
dignitary interest in autonomous self-presentation. 
  By 1910, several states recognized a “right to privacy” at common 
law or by statute.94 New York’s highest court refused to acknowledge the 
privacy tort, claiming that without a foundation in a property right, there 
was no legal basis for a right to privacy, and that the common law did not 
provide redress for independent harm to feelings.95 In response, in 1903, 
that state’s legislature enacted a privacy statute that permitted damages and 
injunctive relief for the dignitary and emotional injuries caused by the 
unauthorized use of one’s image in a commercial context.96 The Supreme 
Court of Michigan refused to acknowledge the privacy tort because of its 
potential implications for freedom of the press.97 Where a cause of action 
for invasion of privacy was approved, it was understood largely in the spirit 
of Warren and Brandeis. The right to privacy was not only about concealing 
the private, but consisted of a broader right to selective and self-controlled 
publicity. It was the right to choose whether one would be publicized and 
how -- the right “to pass through the world, if one chose, without having his 
picture published, his business enterprises discussed …or his eccentricities 
commented upon either in handbills circulars, catalogues, periodicals, or 
newspapers.”98 It was the prerogative to “live a life of publicity as to certain 
                                                
92 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 450 (N.Y. 1902).  
93 George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 
LA. L. REV. 443, 455 (1990).   
94 At common law: Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); 
Pritchett v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 85 N.E. 32 (Ind. App. 1908); Foster-Millburn Co. 
v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909), appeal after remand, 127 S.W. 476 (Ky. 1910); 
Schulman v. Whitaker, 39 So. 737 (La. 1906); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 A. 97 (N.J. E. & 
A. 1907). By statute: New York, 1903, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50; Utah, 1909, UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-8 and 76-4-9; Virginia, 1904, VA. CODE ANN.§ 8-650. 
95 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902).  
96 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50. Because the interest protected was one’s right to keep 
one’s identity outside of a commercial setting, an actionable injury could occur even if the 
depiction was sympathetic or flattering. In Almind v. Sea Beach Railway, from 1913, a 
New York appeals court upheld an injunction against a railway company that had made a 
short instructional film about railroad safety and used a short film clip of the plaintiff 
getting out of a rail car. The scene was in no way humiliating or embarrassing. The court 
nonetheless held that the woman’s privacy had been invaded because the film was for 
“advertising purposes.” Almind v. Sea Beach Railway, 157 AD 230, 232 (1913). 
97 Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 377, 384 (1899).   
98 Adams, The Law of Privacy, supra at 361. 
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matters and of privacy as to others.”99 To paraphrase one modern privacy 
scholar, privacy was a legal principle of public “identity maintenance.”100 
 
3. Libel and the Law of Image   
  Given the concerns with “invasions of privacy” committed by the 
press, there were surprisingly few cases in this period brought over 
newspaper “gossip” and the publication of private facts. One reason may 
have been the seriousness of the injury -- the publication of highly personal 
information may have been so humiliating that victims were reluctant to 
bring a lawsuit and draw further attention to the embarrassing matter. 
Another reason may have been the availability of the libel tort as a means of 
redress for gossip and other undesirable publicity.  
  The law of libel and slander – written and spoken defamation, 
respectively – was an elaborate system of complex doctrines that dated back 
to the earliest history of the common law.101 A defamatory statement 
“expose[d] a person to hatred or contempt…injure[d] him in his profession 
or trade, [and] cause[d] him to be shunned by his neighbors,” in the words 
of an 1890 treatise.102 The essence of the harm was the loss of one’s good 
name in the community.103 Privacy law looked inward, to a person’s 
emotions; defamation law looked outward, to the quality of one’s social 
relations.104 Before 1964, the plaintiff in a libel suit needed only to present 
the derogatory statement and prove that the defendant was responsible for 
publishing the statement to others, not that the statement was false. The 
defendant could avoid liability by proving that the statement was true.105  
Although the defamation tort at this time was “free of rigid and 
                                                
99 Pavesich, supra at 70.  
100See Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 371 (2003).  
101 On the history of defamation, see Bezanson, supra at 536-539; Post, supra at 693-
707; William Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839, 841-2 (1960); Stanley Ingber, 
Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L. REV. 785, 796-801 
(1979).   
102 WILLIAM ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 19 (1887).   
103 I will focus on libel law and written publications because they were more likely  
than spoken communication to be involved in the creation of a “public image” in the sense 
I have described it – the impressions one made before a public audience. Libels had 
traditionally been considered to be more dangerous than slander because of the wide 
circulation and permanency of written communication. See Ingber, supra at 797. 
104 Reputation was a “relational interest.” See Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 
ILL. L. REV. 460, 463 (1934). See also Bezanson, supra at 341.  
105 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). In the words of William 
Prosser, “out of a tender regard for reputations, the law presumes in the first instance that 
all defamation is false and the defendant has the burden of pleading and proving its truth.” 
WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 798 (4th ed. 1971).  
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strictly circumscribed social class distinctions and … available to remedy 
injuries to a wide range of reputational interests,”106 for much of the 19th 
century, libel plaintiffs had generally been from the privileged classes.107 
The typical libel case had involved a public figure plaintiff, usually a 
politician or other high status person, suing the press over political criticism 
or accusations of immoral conduct.108 There was nonetheless something of a 
reluctance to sue over injurious words; as E.L. Godkin had noted in 1880, 
particularly in the South, there was a strong feeling that there was 
something “unmanly or discreditable in seeking redress for libel in the 
courts, instead of challenging the offender to single combat.”109 By the end 
of the century, this reticence appears to have waned. Popular journalism, 
with its focus on personalities and private lives, and its efforts to lure 
readers through gossip, sensationalism, and “true stories,” led to dramatic 
depictions, portraits, and accusations that injured the vanity and sensibilities 
of those caught in its path and produced legal responses.110 With frequency, 
apparent zeal, and perhaps even skill, Americans were mobilizing the law to 
deal with the mass media and its perceived assaults to personal image.111  
 Though libel cases in this period were often brought around serious 
charges, such as allegations of adultery or dishonesty in business,112 many 
involved publications that were more likely to cause embarrassment or hurt 
feelings rather than serious reputational injuries. Many alleged libels, in 
other words, involved material that was not clearly false or defamatory -- in 
many cases not even unflattering – but, like many claimed “invasions of 
privacy,” contradicted the way plaintiffs wanted to be known to the public. 
                                                
106 See Bezanson, supra at 539. 
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In a 1912 case, a former Oxford professor brought suit when an article in a 
New York newspaper alleged that he was unemployed and “too educated to 
make a living.”113 In Corr v. Sun Printing & Publishing (1904), the New 
York Sun published a story about a woman robbery suspect and named her 
as a 35 year old teacher, Kittie Carr. Kate Corr, a 26 year old teacher, sued 
the paper, claiming that the publication damaged her reputation, as “Kate 
and Kittie are the same name” and their surnames were similar.114 The court 
rejected the claim.115 The piece had not defamed her; the only thing it had 
done was to raise the anxieties of an image-conscious woman who feared, 
probably unreasonably, that others’ impressions of her had been tarnished. 
Many libel cases, like privacy cases, involved the publication of 
photographs in contexts that were undesirable to the subject, although 
nondefamatory and often nondisparaging.116 In Knickerbocker v. Press 
Publishing (1911), an 18-year old woman unsuccessfully sued over the 
newspaper publication of a photograph of her taken when she was a baby, 
claiming it to be libelous because it was embarrassing.117 
  A valid claim for libel would exist only if such depictions conveyed 
a false impression and were damaging to one’s standing among one’s peers. 
Actions would not be permitted for statements or portrayals that were 
merely unflattering, misleading, or offensive solely to the subject of 
publicity.118 The libel tort did not permit damages to be awarded for 
emotional harms in the absence of injury to reputation; it was not a “balm 
for wounded feelings.” Damages for emotional injuries could be awarded in 
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cases where a defamatory publication was proven, on the theory that hurt 
feelings inevitably accompanied a loss of reputation.119 Legal critics of the 
time argued that given the potential severity of the harms, defamation law 
should compensate emotional injuries inflicted by unflattering depictions in 
the media, even in the absence of harm to reputation.120 An author in the 
American Law Register had written that embarrassing photographs 
depicting the subject in a “ridiculous light” should be actionable as libels, 
even if the photo did not convey an impression that was false or 
defamatory.121 John Henry Wigmore advocated a cause of action that would 
permit individuals to be compensated for dignitary harms caused by certain 
classes of false or misrepresentative statements, even if they did not fall 
within the accepted definition of defamation.122 Elbridge Adams criticized 
the fact that under existing libel doctrine unwanted publicity that did not 
injure reputation could not be remedied under the law, no matter how 
distressed the subject was by it.123 Early twentieth century courts were 
generally unwilling to alter libel doctrine in this way. Fifty years later, 
however, libel law’s scope had expanded to cover a broad range of injuries 
to the image, injuries that were not only external and objective -- to one’s 
reputation and standing before the public --  but also internal and subjective 
-- to one’s feelings about one’s public image.  
 
 
II. THE IMAGE SOCIETY, 1920-1950 
 
The image society matured in the period between 1920 and 1950, 
and the law was intertwined with it and shaped by it. This era saw an 
increasing cultural focus on personal image, the growth of the mass media, 
a profusion of images in the visual environment, and new industries of 
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image management.124 These developments contributed to the expansion of 
image law to protect a broader range of perceived threats to the image and 
to the rise of the personal image lawsuit. In a series of cases involving false, 
embarrassing, and unfavorable depictions in the media, courts affirmed the 
prevailing popular belief that individuals had a legal entitlement to control 
their self-presentation before the public, one that could, under many 
circumstances, override public rights to a free press and freedom of 
expression. 
 
A. An “escalating cycle of self-consciousness” 
In the first third of the twentieth century, as historian Jackson Lears 
has observed, personal identity had become much more “problematic than 
earlier generations had imagined,” and concerns with the presentation of 
self in public reached new levels of intensity.125 This “escalating cycle of 
self-consciousness” can be attributed in significant part to the 
preoccupations and pressures of a mass consumer society. By the 1920s, the 
producer economy of the 19th century, in which creative, psychic, and 
productive energy were directed towards the production of goods, had been 
supplanted by a consumer society, where the focus was on the acquisition of 
goods.126 Advertising encouraged people to define their identities in terms 
of their possessions and purchases, and shopping was transformed from a 
functional activity into a form of leisure and a source of meaning and 
pleasure.127 This shift from production to consumption led to the growth of 
the sales and service industries and the rise of a white-collar work force. 
Critics feared that the self-made man, pioneering his way to prosperity on 
the frontier or in the freewheeling urban marketplace, had become extinct in 
a world of large corporations managed by faceless bureaucracies.128  
These shifts in economic organization and the nature of work called 
for the cultivation of personal qualities that were different from the “real or 
imagined virtues” of the self-disciplined “Victorian entrepreneur.”129 
Bureaucratic jobs removed more and more individuals from direct 
involvement in the production process and demanded involvement with 
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people rather than things.130 Advancement no longer required displaying 
personal attributes associated with productivity, industry, and self-restraint, 
but rather knowing how to persuade and charm. To a far greater extent than 
the earlier ideal of self-presentation, which involved to some degree the 
externalization of inner moral traits,131 the new model was more frankly 
oriented around pleasing appearances.132 People were told that they had to 
“sell” themselves and their images to others in order to succeed,133 and were 
encouraged to develop a “hypersensitivity” to the feelings and judgments of 
others as a means to public acceptance and social mobility.134  
At the same time popular advice literature asserted that people 
should be natural and express themselves, “in virtually the same breath, the 
reader is also urged repeatedly to… eliminate the little personal whims, 
habits, [and] traits that make people dislike you,” according to historian 
Warren Susman.135 As Orison Swett Marden, the author of the advice 
manual Masterful Personality summarized in 1921, “so much of our success 
depends on what others think of us.”136 Dale Carnegie’s 1936 bestseller 
How to Win Friends and Influence People reinforced the idea that the key to 
success was to manipulate one’s image in order to impress and manipulate 
others.137 The notion that social advancement and career success could be 
achieved through superficial alterations of one’s conduct and appearance 
was not merely the claim of advertisers and self-help gurus. Employers 
were paying increasing attention to the looks and personalities of potential 
employees when making hiring decisions, particularly in the burgeoning 
service professions.138 
This project of meticulous image management was driven by new 
industries of image. This period saw an explosion of visually-illustrated 
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print media and new technologies for capturing and reproducing images on 
a mass scale, including motion pictures. Radio, movies, and print media 
achieved nationwide audiences and became the common denominator of 
American culture.139 The emerging beauty, cosmetics and mass-produced 
fashion industries heightened the average person’s attention to her visual 
image and offered new possibilities for transforming it. Makeup and 
clothing manufacturers encouraged women to change their styles to achieve 
popularity and meet the social demands of the moment.140 Advertising had 
become a persistent feature of everyday life,141 and the mission of the ad 
agency was to create discomforts and dissatisfactions with one’s appearance 
and image that could only be assuaged through the purchase of goods. 
Beginning in the 1920s, “the women in ads were constantly observing 
themselves, ever self-critical….a noticeable proportion of magazine ads 
directed at women depicted them looking into mirrors,” according to 
historian Stuart Ewen.142 “Each portion of the body was to be viewed 
critically, as a potential bauble in a successful assemblage.”143 Through the 
careful use of products, one could create a new image and a brand new 
self.144 It was in this period that the concept of the “makeover” entered 
popular culture.145  
The early 20th century saw the rise of a national celebrity culture that 
revolved around entertainment stars, particularly film actors. The actor, for 
whom taking off and putting on guises was an art and a profession, became 
an object of immense interest and fascination, and a kind of modal self in an 
age of image consciousness. Typically of humble origin, the would-be 
celebrity transformed her self, her status, and her fortunes in life by 
changing her image.146 The emergence of this success narrative –that one 
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might rise in status solely by developing a pleasing image -- marked a new 
chapter in the American rags to riches story. Stars understood the 
relationship between image and success, and their life stories were object 
lessons in the importance of appearances and first impressions. The public 
followed with rapt attention the attempts of celebrities to invent and 
reinvent themselves and to perfect their public images, and the efforts of an 
organized and aggressive industry of counterimages – tabloids, gossip 
columns, and scandal sheets -- to deconstruct star identities by committing 
“invasions of privacy.”147 The celebrity’s engagement in an “information 
game” -- “a potentially infinite cycle of concealment, discovery, false 
revelation, and discovery,” in Erving Goffman’s words -- was said to 
represent the struggle, writ large, that every person would wage in her own 
efforts to create and perfect her public persona.148 
In this era we can see the beginnings of a “consciousness of self-
construction,” to use sociologist Kenneth Gergen’s term, in which the idea 
of a stable self weakened and gave way to “strategic manipulation.” The 
individual “increasingly and distressingly” found himself playing different 
roles to “achieve social gains.”149 By the 1920s, the idea of a “discontinuous 
self” was beginning to be discussed.150 In his Principles of Psychology, 
William James had written that a “man has as many social selves as there 
are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their 
mind.” Even if many of these impressions overlapped, “he has as many 
different social selves are there are distinct groups of persons about whose 
opinion he cares.”151 Social psychologist Charles Horton Cooley coined the 
concept of the “looking glass self” – the notion that the self is the product of 
an interaction between how one saw oneself and how others saw her. 
Through interaction with others, through our consciousness of others’ 
reactions to us, we develop a sense of who we are.152 The notion that 
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identity is a social construction assembled out of the various impressions 
one made on others would become a major theme in twentieth-century 
sociology and social psychology.153  
This fragmentation of the self and the superficial and 
“discontinuous” nature of personal identity should not be overstated. 
Enduring communities, familial bonds, and religious institutions continued 
to provide strong foundations of identity for many individuals. Particularly 
in traditional communities, where personal relationships were reliable, 
continuous, and face-to-face, a firm sense of identity was broadly 
supported.154 Most Americans undoubtedly conceived of themselves as 
more than merely assemblages of social facades and “stage effects.”155 The 
uprooted and transient nature of an increasingly mobile urban society, and 
the imperatives and faiths of modern consumer culture, nonetheless 
encouraged people to view themselves less in terms of enduring 
relationships, stable qualities, and moral visions, and more in terms of the 
various images one strategically created, manipulated, and projected to 
others. The self was coming to be regarded as more malleable and unstable, 
and more thoroughly a matter of individual control and design than in the 
past. By the end of the first half of the 20th century, the project of 
constructing and presenting a public image and identity had become more 
complex, burdensome, and fraught with anxieties than in any previous 
generation.  
The upshot of these developments was not only an increased 
consciousness of image, but also a feeling of entitlement to one’s image. 
The more that a desirable image came to be regarded as essential to social 
status and advancement, and the more one’s appearance before others seen 
as coextensive with one’s identity, the deeper the sense of a right to control 
and manage one’s public image. In a culture where image was freighted 
with possibility and meaning, and regarded as inextricably intertwined with 
one’s self and public persona, depriving a person of control over her public 
image was understood as an indignity that could be potentially severe.  
 
B. The Tort Law of Image and the Personal Image Lawsuit 
Between 1920 and 1950, existing areas of tort law expanded and 
new torts were created to protect personal image and the perceived right to 
control one’s image. In this period a majority of states recognized the tort 
right to privacy, understood as a right to avoid undesirable and 
“unwarranted publicity.”156 At the same time, courts stretched the limits of 
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defamation doctrine to provide redress to plaintiffs who had experienced 
emotional distress when presented before the public in an upsetting or 
unfavorable manner, even though not injurious to one’s reputation. A new 
tort action compensated individuals for emotional distress caused by 
interference with their images that was severe and intentionally inflicted. A 
“right of publicity” was created to protect the right to control the 
commercial exploitation of one’s image and to reap the profits from such 
exploitation.  
This expansion of image law was both a cause and consequence of 
an increasing number of image-based lawsuits. The growth of the mass 
media, and popular journalism’s insatiable hunger for personal images and 
stories produced predictable casualties: embarrassing representations, hurt 
feelings, tarnished reputations. As victims of unfavorable media depictions 
resorted to the law to vindicate their public images and their feelings about 
their images, the personal image lawsuit became a phenomenon of 
American legal culture.  
 
1. Privacy  
By 1940, more than half the states recognized a tort right to 
privacy.157 As lawyer Louis Nizer observed that year, “in recent years the 
courts which have recognized the right of privacy for the first time have not 
felt obliged to indulge in lengthy apologia. This is the final stage in the 
acceptance of any new legal doctrine.”158 Courts concerned with the 
proliferation of the mass media and its potentially damaging effects on 
dignity and reputation “continuously look[ed] for ways to give individuals 
more legal control of public presentations of their lives,” according to legal 
scholar Diane Zimmerman.159 While they may not have intended to fashion 
a body of privacy law, the absence of alternative routes to compensate 
victims of media misrepresentation led them to expand and develop the 
privacy tort.  
Compared to the earlier period, there were fewer “invasion of 
privacy” cases brought over the unauthorized use of portraits in 
advertisements. Advertisers were now employing professional models 
rather than purchasing images on the open market, and with the culture’s 
embrace of celebrity and consumerism, it was no longer shameful but 
acceptable and perhaps even prestigious to have one’s image used in a 
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commercial context.160 A reflection of the news and entertainment media’s 
relentless focus on personalities and private lives, the real action in privacy 
litigation in this period instead involved photographs and personal 
information in various news and feature publications.161 In several cases, 
the media were alleged to have invaded privacy by publishing especially 
personal or private material, such as information about a medical condition 
or depictions of a person’s body in a state of illness.162 Suits involving such 
intimate matters were generally successful.163 In Barber v. Time (1947), the 
Missouri Supreme Court held that a woman had a cause of action for 
invasion of privacy when a photograph of her in a hospital room receiving 
treatment was published in Time magazine.164 Courts also held that legally 
cognizable invasions of privacy had occurred when the news media 
published the details of horrific accidents and crimes.165 
The majority of privacy cases did not involve items that were 
particularly personal, however, but rather situations where an individual had 
been presented to the public in a way that she found humiliating, 
misrepresentative, or otherwise objectionable. In some cases, the challenged 
depiction was not even unflattering; it simply contradicted the way the 
plaintiff wanted to be known to others.166 No exposure of private life had 
occurred. In these cases, the law of “privacy” had nothing to do with 
privacy but was instead about protecting individuals from unflattering 
associations and uncomfortable publicity.167 Under this view, the right of 
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privacy was a right not to have one’s identity depicted in a manner that 
clashed with one’s own self-image, “under circumstances which are 
complimentary as well as those which are critical.”168 
The 1947 case Cason v. Baskin is illustrative. Cason involved a 
privacy claim brought against the popular author Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings 
by a woman who was the inspiration for a character in her book Cross 
Creek.169 The portrayal of Cason was on the whole favorable, although in 
one part of the book Rawlings described her as an “ageless spinster 
resembling an angry and efficient canary” and noted that she used 
profanity.170 The plaintiff, who sought damages of 100,000 dollars, did not 
claim that these comments were false, only that they intruded upon her 
privacy – “destroyed her peace of mind” and “outrage[d] the finer 
sentiments of her nature” – by presenting her before a mass audience in a 
way that she found unfavorable.171 The Florida Supreme Court believed that 
the author had portrayed Cason, on the whole, as a “fine and attractive 
personality” but held nonetheless that the woman stated a valid privacy 
claim. It suggested that her privacy had been invaded because her personal 
qualities, though hardly concealed or “private,” were offered up to a mass 
public in a way she had never intended or desired.172  
A similar claim was made in Molony v. Boy Comics, involving an 
assistant pharmacist’s mate in the Coast Guard whose activities saving 
individuals from a plane crash were depicted in comic book style.173 The 
comic heroicized him. The plaintiff nonetheless alleged that the portrayal 
contained minor inaccuracies and depicted him as somewhat more 
effeminate than he would have liked. As such, it contradicted his own self-
image, injured his sensibilities, and invaded his privacy.174 In Binns v. 
Vitagraph, a radio operator involved in a shipwreck successfully sued for 
invasion of privacy over a depiction of him in a short movie, even though 
the film flattered him and made him out to be the hero of the event.175  
Several privacy cases involved individuals who appeared in public 
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places and whose pictures were taken and subsequently displayed in a 
newspaper or film. Embarrassed to have been publicized, or because their 
photos were presented in what they considered a disagreeable context, they 
brought claims for “invasion of privacy.” Blumenthal v. Picture Classics 
involved a woman, a bread vendor on the street, who was filmed and 
depicted in a newsreel in a manner she claimed was humiliating. The court 
agreed that an actionable invasion of “privacy” had occurred, even though 
the woman had been out in public.176 In 1937, a woman claimed that 
unauthorized newsreel footage taken of her in an exercise course for 
overweight women was an invasion of privacy because the footage was 
unauthorized and embarrassing.177 In Gill v. Hearst Publishing, a married 
couple that had been photographed embracing at an outdoor farmers’ 
market, and the picture used to illustrate an article in Harper’s Bazaar 
magazine about “love at first sight,” brought a lawsuit against the magazine, 
alleging that the picture invaded their privacy because it was 
“uncomplimentary.”178  
 Another twist on this genre involved people’s attempts to use privacy 
law to conceal their pasts. The plaintiff in the 1931 case Melvin v. Reid was 
a former prostitute who had been tried for murder and acquitted, but who 
had been rehabilitated, had married, and had achieved a place in respectable 
society. A movie was produced based on the story of her life, using her true 
maiden name. She alleged that the presentation of facts about her earlier 
days of ill-repute, much of it a matter of public record, tarnished the 
upstanding new image she had worked hard to create and was thus an 
invasion of privacy. The California Supreme Court agreed.179 In 1949, a 
professional boxer who had retired from the ring to pursue a life of 
anonymity sued NBC over a radio broadcast in which Groucho Marx had 
discussed his boxing career. The former pugilist argued that this 
interference with his present public image -- effectively, an image of “no 
image” -- was an unwarranted invasion of privacy.180  
The judicial response to these “undesirable representation” cases 
was mixed. In a few reported cases in the 1930s and 40s, courts noted the 
privacy tort’s potentially chilling effect on publishing and suggested that 
such limitations on publication were an unconstitutional violation of 
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freedom of the press. These courts fashioned a broad “newsworthiness” 
privilege that exempted from liability a wide range of publications on public 
officials and public affairs, on the theory that a right of privacy that covered 
“news items and articles of general public interest, educational and 
informative in character” implicated the rights of a “free press.”181 This 
privilege for “matters of public interest” or “newsworthy” material had been 
presaged in “The Right to Privacy,” although the modern version extended 
far beyond what had been envisioned by Warren and Brandeis. Under the 
most expansive reading of the privilege offered by a few courts in the 1930s 
and 40s, only depictions of matters of public interest that were truly 
offensive -- that caused severe “mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a 
person of ordinary sensibilities” -- would be actionable as invasions of 
privacy.182 In a famous 1940 case, the Second Circuit used this rationale to 
reject liability for a newsworthy publication that was embarrassing but 
offensive only to the hypersensitive subject.183  
Many of the “undesirable representation” suits were nonetheless 
successful. Courts permitted a cause of action for invasion of privacy based 
on publicity that had not revealed material that was “private,” but that was 
undesirable to the subject of publicity, even if not objectively embarrassing 
or offensive.184 In Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., a pilot in an 
airplane emergency was depicted in a dramatized television reenactment of 
the event. He alleged that the portrayal, which inaccurately showed him out 
of uniform, praying, and smoking cigarettes, placed him in a “false 
position” and caused him humiliation and suffering.185 A federal district 
court in California held that he had a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy.186 In the 1948 case Peay v. Curtis, a taxicab driver brought suit for 
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invasion of privacy over a publication in the Saturday Evening Post that 
featured her picture alongside an article that was critical of cab drivers and 
accused them of cheating, but that did not explicitly name or refer to her.187 
The court determined that the depiction was an actionable invasion of 
privacy. It reached the astonishingly broad conclusion that the unauthorized 
publication of a photograph of a person who was not a public figure was a 
violation of her privacy right, even if the person was in a public place.188 
When the press engaged in “undue and undesirable publicity, such as is 
involved in the circulation of [one’s] likeness without permission,” it 
abused its freedom.189 
It is hard not to regard such claims as petty. There is no evidence, 
however, that they were insincere or duplicitous. The men and women 
presented in an inaccurate and perhaps even ridiculous manner in various 
newsreels, comic strips, and articles may well have been deeply hurt and 
perhaps even horrified. This sense of outrage, if it did exist, is also a 
testament to the image consciousness of the time. It is only in a culture 
where individuals feel an entitlement to their images that such 
representations, even if objectively benign, will be experienced as serious 
injuries to one’s dignity and feelings.  
 
2. The law of feelings  
The flourishing of tort privacy in this period was a product not only 
of the culture of images but also a culture of feeling. As discussed, the 
foundational assumption of the privacy tort -- that injuries to one’s image 
and one’s feelings about one’s image were worthy of redress and 
compensation -- had been novel and largely disfavored at the time of 
Warren and Brandeis. The common law had traditionally resisted 
compensation for emotional injuries unconnected to the violation of other 
established rights; courts cited difficulties of proof, the possibility of 
spurious or insincere claims, and the potential unleashing of a flood of 
litigation.190 There was a sense that emotional harms were not significant 
enough to warrant legal recognition and were better dealt with by 
“instruments of social control other than the law.”191 By the 1950s, much of 
this resistance had dissipated. 
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This movement towards greater legal recognition of the emotions 
had several origins. One was the continued effort by legal realist scholars to 
further the Warren and Brandeis argument that the common law should 
recognize emotional integrity as part of a broader constellation of dignitary 
and “personality” rights. In 1915, Roscoe Pound argued for “rights of 
personality,” encompassing both physical and emotional interests.192 The 
torts theorist Leon Green in 1936 advocated legal protection for aspects of 
“personality” including one’s name, emotions, and personal history.193 Both 
Green and Pound had regarded a right to one’s image as an aspect of one’s 
personality rights; as Green wrote, one’s likeness, name, and other personal 
attributes could not “be exposed or used by others without causing acute 
mental and emotional suffering.”194  
This view of emotional injuries as legitimate and serious had 
increasing purchase among both the legal community and the lay public. 
The professionalization of psychology and the advent of the behavioral 
sciences had produced a new appreciation of the psychic and emotional 
aspects of daily life.195 The condition of one’s feelings and one’s psyche 
was coming to be regarded as not merely a minor, intangible interest but as 
having significant, measurable behavioral and even physical consequences. 
At the time, this may have been the most convincing aspect of the argument 
for a law of feelings -- the perceived connection between emotional and 
bodily harm. A 1922 writer in the Michigan Law Review, noting the 
discoveries of  “medical men and psychologists” about “emotion and its 
effect on the human body,” observed that “emotion as a purely mental thing 
does not exist.”196 As Pound had written, one’s feelings and relationships 
were “as much a part of [one’s] personality” as his body.197  
This recognition of both the independent significance of the 
emotions and the mind-body connection gave rise to another branch of the 
law of image, the freestanding tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.198 By 1936, the torts scholar Calvert Magruder could assert that 
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“no longer is it even approximately true that the law does not pretend to 
redress mental pain and anguish when the unlawful act complained of 
causes that alone.”199 The 1934 Restatement of Torts had taken the position 
that there was no recovery for emotional injury even when intentionally 
inflicted; by 1948, it had reversed its position and stated that one could 
recover for such injuries.200 The emotional distress tort had obvious 
overlaps with the privacy tort; claims for invasion of one’s privacy interests 
were often brought under the emotional distress tort, and the privacy tort 
protected, in its own right, as William Prosser observed in 1935, the “right 
to be free from the intentional infliction of mental suffering.”201  
The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort had been 
recognized in cases where defendants had put plaintiffs in fear of their 
safety or another person’s safety, as when the plaintiff witnessed the 
defendant’s willful attack on a third person.202 Cases had also been brought 
over severe verbal assaults, such as threats of arrest or bodily injury, or acts 
that led to extreme embarrassment, as when a person was made a victim of 
a humiliating practical joke carried out before the public.203 In a few cases, 
plaintiffs brought emotional distress claims against newspapers for falsely 
reporting a family member’s death. In 1921, a newspaper was sued by a 
woman whose son’s photograph had been mistakenly published with a 
report of the death of another person having the same name.204 The essence 
of the harm in these cases was akin to shock or fright.205  
Emotional distress claims would eventually be brought over 
publications alleged to be harmful to one’s image. In many such cases, the 
publication was neither false nor invasive of privacy, yet plaintiffs claimed 
to be mortified and outraged because they had been humiliated and their 
appearance before others severely tarnished. These sorts of claims were 
largely a phenomenon of the post-World War II era and will be discussed 
later. Their origins can be traced to the first half of the century and the 
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culture’s heightened appreciation of both outward appearances and the inner 
life; images, feelings, and the perceived intimate relation between the two.   
  
3. Libel Law in the Age of Image  
The same influences that led to the expansion of privacy law also 
contributed to the transformation of the law and culture of libel. A 
byproduct of the proliferation of the mass media, libel litigation increased 
substantially in the early 20th century, as an array of claimants, ranging from 
political officials to the proverbial man on the street, brought claims against 
the press.206 The risk of multiple libel suits had come to be regarded as the 
inevitable price of running a publishing enterprise, and publishers began to 
invest in defensive measures such as libel insurance, prepublication review, 
and the retention of libel lawyers.207 Fueling publishers’ fears of large 
judgments against them were not only the zeal with which libel claims were 
often pursued, but courts’ apparent sympathies towards plaintiffs. In the 
interwar period, courts were expanding the definition of a defamatory 
publication and the concept of reputational harms. 
Historically, to be libeled was to have one’s character or morals 
attacked,208 or to otherwise be subjected to “scorn… hatred…[or] 
contempt” in a way that seriously impaired the way others viewed her and 
were likely to treat her.209 A publication “might be unpleasant; it may 
subject him to…banter from those who knew him, even to the extent of 
affecting his feelings, but this in itself is not enough,” noted a New York 
appeals court in 1912, rejecting a claim that a false report of the plaintiff’s 
death was libelous.210 Yet by the 1930s, courts were beginning to expand 
the concept of reputational injury to include situations where a statement 
did not did not cast aspersions on a person’s character or lower his standing 
before others, but that nonetheless subjected him to shame and mental 
distress.211 In 1935, Magruder noted libel cases where plaintiffs had won 
compensation not for an invasion of one’s interest in reputation but for “the 
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sense of outrage and chagrin that the defendant should have made an attack 
upon his reputation.”212 Libel law was turning its focus from external, 
interpersonal relations inward, to the realm of one’s self-perception and 
feelings about one’s public image.  
Thus it was that in 1926 a court held that a woman had a cause of 
action for libel when a newspaper article said that she had been served with 
process while sitting in a bathtub -- an accusation that did not “impute 
immoral conduct” or likely damage her reputation, but nonetheless 
embarrassed her.213 In Zbyszko v. New York American, from 1930, a New 
York appeals court held that a newspaper article about evolution featuring 
the name and picture of the plaintiff, a wrestler, and the words “the wrestler, 
not fundamentally different from the gorilla in physique” was potentially 
libelous.214 The depiction was not false, and it probably did not injure the 
wrestler’s professional repute, although it was distressing to him. Van 
Wiginton v. Pulitzer was a case of mistaken identities in which a newspaper 
published the plaintiff’s picture alongside a story about a young girl who 
had tried to save her father from the gallows. Damages were allowed for 
libel although the publication was largely favorable and imputed nothing 
disparaging to her character.215 As the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted 
in 1940, libel law had become a potential vehicle to reach certain “indecent 
violations of privacy.”216 In other words, plaintiffs complaining about 
unfavorable and upsetting portrayals that before would not have been 
considered defamatory could now find redress not only in the law of 
privacy but also potentially through a cause of action for libel.  
The key case in this trend was the famous Second Circuit case 
Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., from 1936, for which Judge Learned 
Hand wrote the opinion.217 The defendant, the Camel cigarette company, 
published a photograph of the plaintiff, a famous jockey, in riding costume 
holding in front of him a saddle and girth. The picture was an advertising 
endorsement for which the jockey had been paid and had willingly posed. 
The plaintiff alleged that the way the picture was shot made it appear that 
the objects he was holding were in fact his genitalia and that he “was guilty 
of indecent exposure.”218 The Second Circuit overturned the lower court 
and held that he had a cause of action for libel because the publication 
embarrassed him and made him the subject of ridicule.219  
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As the Harvard Law Review observed, Burton v. Crowell was the 
first major decision that held that “unintentionally causing ridicule of the 
plaintiff” was libelous per se.220 Many legal critics observed not only what 
they saw as the hypersensitivity of the plaintiff, but the absence of any real 
harm to his reputation. As one writer commented, the real injury was to the 
“plaintiff’s feelings, on account of the mortification he suffered and 
irritation at the good natured joshing of his friends. The laughter at his 
expense was not on account of anything in the publication tending to lower 
him in the esteem of others.”221 The decision extended “the law of libel to a 
situation where the plaintiff’s reputation is not impaired in the slightest.”222 
Burton was widely acknowledged but not broadly adopted at the 
time. The majority position remained that “the injury to feelings which the 
law of defamation recognizes is not the suffering of the making of the 
charge but the suffering which is caused by other people’s conduct towards 
him in consequence of it.”223 The decision nonetheless heralded the 
movement in the postwar era towards the extension of libel beyond the 
protection of “reputation,” in the sense of the opinions of others, to a 
broader “protection against emotionally embarrassing situations.”224 By the 
mid-1950s, courts were extending defamation law to cover situations in 
which there was little if any injury to one’s standing before others and were 
compensating plaintiffs solely for emotional distress.225 They were 
particularly likely to do so in jurisdictions where the privacy and emotional 
distress torts were not recognized.226 Defamation and privacy had so 
overlapped, legal commentators observed, that that the majority of 
defamation actions could be brought for invasion of the right of privacy, 
and vice versa.227 No longer was it entirely true that “the fundamental 
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difference between the right to privacy and …. defamation is that the former 
directly concerns one’s peace of mind, while the latter concerns primarily 
one’s reputation.”228 In providing compensation for the plaintiff’s subjective 
distress over an unwanted and unfavorable portrayal, regardless of its effect 
on third parties, the tort actions for libel and privacy were converging.229 
 
4. The “right of publicity”  
The 1940s and 50s saw the beginnings of another innovation in the 
tort law of image, one that was entirely novel and that would eventually 
occupy a significant role in the body of American image rights. This was 
the “right of publicity,” an offshoot of tort privacy, which extended the right 
to control one’s image to include the right to reap full economic value from 
the commercial exploitation of one’s image -- one’s photograph, likeness, 
or other recognizable aspects of one’s persona or identity. Unlike the other 
image torts, the protected interest was pecuniary rather than dignitary. Its 
recognition was an apt reflection of the new directions that modern image-
consciousness was taking. By the mid-twentieth century, both popular and 
judicial sentiment supported the idea of legal compensation for the many 
different kinds of harm that could be caused by loss of control over one’s 
image -- to one’s feelings, dignity, and pocketbook.230  
At the turn of the century, the idea of a legally protected right to 
commercially exploit one’s name and likeness had been disfavored. It went 
against the prevailing view of one’s image, particularly one’s photographic 
image, as an expression of the inner soul or “personality” that should not be 
commodified.231 Thirty or forty years later, the public was no longer 
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uncomfortable with the idea of profiting from their images and identities. 
Movie stars were licensing their names to advertisers, and licensing 
companies had been created to market the names and images of 
celebrities.232 In a celebrity culture, where fame and public exposure were 
regarded as the pinnacle of success, selling one’s image for profit was no 
longer viewed “as quasi-illicit.”233 The ability to commercially exploit one’s 
persona was a sign that one had “made it.”  
The law nonetheless retained the Victorian anti-commodification 
ethos for many years after the public had abandoned it. In the 1920s and 
30s, lacking avenues of legal recourse outside the context of a breach of 
contract, celebrities seeking compensation for the unauthorized commercial 
appropriation of their names and likenesses brought cases under the “right 
of privacy” claiming dignitary harms, even though their true interests may 
have been pecuniary.234 These attempts were generally unsuccessful. Courts 
reasoned that because self-exposure was the basis of celebrity, stars could 
not claim to be offended by additional publicity. They had, in effect, waived 
their right to privacy.235  The New York privacy statute offered protection 
against unauthorized commercial uses of the persona but damages were 
awarded for dignitary harm, not lost profits. If the plaintiff could not show a 
use of the image that was offensive, that caused hurt feelings, he would not 
succeed in recovering any compensation.236  
Yet as celebrity culture became deeply entrenched, and as both 
celebrities and noncelebrities brought suit alleging economic loss from 
unauthorized uses of their names and pictures, courts began to acknowledge 
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more frankly the commercial value of image.237 They nonetheless continued 
to reject the idea of making the persona into a commodity.238 It was not 
until the 1950s that a federal appeals court explicitly recognized the right of 
a person to protect the publicity value of his persona. In Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, from 1953, the Second Circuit 
noted that in addition to a right of privacy, a person had a “right of 
publicity” in his photograph, “for it is common knowledge that many 
prominent persons … far from having their feelings bruised through public 
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer 
received money for authorizing advertisements.”239 By the mid-1950s, 
Melville Nimmer observed, the “right of each person to control and profit 
from the publicity value” of his persona had emerged as a legally 
cognizable right.240 The “right of publicity” was sometimes described as a 
property right, but more commonly as an aspect of the tort “right to 
privacy.”241  
With the recognition of the right of publicity, the foundations of the 
modern tort law of image had been established. They rested on what could 
be described as a frank acceptance of the significance of image to personal 
identity, commercial and social relations, and public life. Gone was the 
fiction that “privacy” was primarily about protecting “a right to be let 
alone,” or that plaintiffs brought libel claims primarily to vindicate their 
good names in the community, or that the principal reaction to having one’s 
image used without consent was embarrassment and shame. What plaintiffs 
seemed to want, and were in many cases getting, was a broad right to 
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control one’s image, to construct and exploit it however one chose.  
 
5. The Laws of Image and Counterimage    
In the interwar period, courts were beginning to develop and 
implement civil libertarian theories of the First Amendment. In so doing, 
they rejected an earlier, state-deferential jurisprudence of freedom of speech 
and press that had upheld limitations on expression in the interest of 
maintaining public order and state-imposed moral standards.242 This 
liberalization of free speech law led to a discussion of the potential conflict 
between the First Amendment and the image torts.243    
We have seen this dialogue in the context of the privacy tort, which 
led courts to fashion a broad “newsworthiness” or “public interest” 
privilege. In libel law, a conditional privilege of fair comment on “matters 
of public concern” was similarly being used to limit judgments against the 
press for defamatory publications involving public figures.244 The privilege, 
eventually constitutionalized in New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964,245 
prohibited a public official from recovering damages for defamatory 
statements about his public activities unless the statement was made with 
reckless disregard of the truth. The privilege covered publications about the 
conduct and characteristics of public officials that were related to their 
public duties, although courts sometimes extended it -- much as they did 
privacy’s “newsworthiness” privilege -- to cover gossip and human interest 
publications that discussed items “of mere public curiosity” if they could be 
construed as “matters of public concern.”246  
The image society was pushing the law in two directions. In a 
culture where personal identities and social relationships were bound up 
with images and representations, the right to control one’s public persona -- 
which included a right to be free from false, damaging, or otherwise 
unauthorized associations -- was being described as essential to self-
definition, self-determination, and the integrity of one’s personality.247 Libel 
and privacy law took cognizance of this interest. At the same time, when 
media images had become central to politics and social life, courts 
recognized the right of publishers and the public to make and circulate 
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representations of individuals, both public figures and private citizens. This 
freedom to image was being described as the essence of constitutional 
freedom of speech.  
In a series of cases in the 1930s and 40s, the Supreme Court 
suggested that it would view state actions restricting or burdening speech 
with heightened scrutiny because of the significance of free expression to 
the democratic process.248 Because free expression was “the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every . . . form of freedom,”249 freedom 
of speech occupied a “preferred position” in the scheme of constitutional 
liberties, and state actions restricting speech could not stand unless justified 
by a compelling government interest beyond mere disagreement with the 
views espoused.250 With the exception of material that posed a “clear and 
present danger” of imminent violence, prohibitions or impairments of 
speech on “matters of public concern” on the basis of disfavored content or 
viewpoints were presumptively unconstitutional.251 
Freedom of the press meant not only liberty to publish, but also the 
right of the public to have access to a broad range of information about 
public events and civic affairs. The Court recognized the significance of the 
mass media -- radio, film, and mass market print publications – as conduits 
for the dissemination of information to the mass public.252 The people’s 
ability to acquire news and information through the media of mass 
communications was being described as the basis of civic discourse, “public 
discussion” and participatory democracy.253 Laws that censored or limited 
publications for no reason other than disagreement or displeasure with their 
content interfered with the public’s right to make independent decisions 
about cultural and media consumption and to establish its own social and 
moral standards, and were an unconstitutional censorship of the press.254  
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Thus, while recognizing the importance of the individual’s control 
over her public image, courts and commentators noted the critical 
democratic significance of the freedom to freely depict, discuss, and 
criticize people and public affairs. Explicitly and implicitly, the legal 
community acknowledged that First Amendment rights and the image torts 
were in tension.255 The response of the courts was at once to expand privacy 
and libel -- to enlarge the understanding of cognizable harms, of what was 
‘private’ or ‘defamatory’--and at the same time to limit the scope of those 
forms of action through various defenses and privileges. The period 
immediately before and after the Second World War was a significant one 
in the development of First Amendment law and image rights; the tensions 
and ambiguities of modern expressive freedom led image law and free 
speech law to advance substantially at the same time.  
 
 
III. THE TRIUMPH OF THE IMAGE IN POSTWAR AMERICA  
 
Indeed, it is one of the significant and often overlooked 
contradictions in the history of free expression that the image torts increased 
their reach and scope in the era of the Warren Court’s expansion of 
expressive liberties and New York Times v. Sullivan. In the post-World War 
II era, new media technologies and a broader national audience for media 
images, an aggressive consumer culture, a pervasive ethos of possessive 
individualism, and the perceived convergence of personal image and 
personal identity created an environment favorable to the further 
development of the law of image, and what has been described as a personal 
image “litigation explosion.”256 The law of image evolved to accommodate 
the complex emotional, psychic, and economic dimensions of personal 
appearance and identity in what was being described as a culture of surfaces 
and an “age of images.”257 
 
1. The Other Directed Personality  
In 1950, the publication of the book The Lonely Crowd marked a 
milestone in the history of the self and the image society. Sociologist David 
Riesman wrote of the rise of a new modal personality type that was 
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emerging as an “influential minority” in the United States258 – the “other 
directed” personality.259 While the “inner-directed” person of the 19th 
century had been guided by an “inner gyroscope” of belief, tradition, and 
morals, the other-directed person looked to his “peers for response and 
guidance, or to their generalized reflection in the mass media.”260 Without a 
stable inner core or internal direction, he continually reinvented himself in 
an effort to please others, aspiring to social approval, psychological 
comfort, and status and material success.261  
Riesman’s book hit a nerve, and it sparked an outpouring of 
commentary and discussion. It seemed to confirm fears of a superficial 
society, the demise of public morals, and the triumph of the ethos of 
celebrity, conformity, and salesmanship.262 The notion of the unstable, 
ungrounded, infinitely malleable self, motivated by the pursuit of peer 
approval and material gain, was echoed in a number of other popular and 
academic works at the time. William Whyte wrote of the “organization 
man,” Erich Fromm talked about a “market oriented personality,” Vance 
Packard described a nation of “status seekers,” and Erving Goffman 
described social interaction as a series of elaborate choreographies of 
deception and self-interest.263 As historian and cultural critic Daniel 
Boorstin wrote in 1962, “before the age of images, it was common to think 
of a conventional person as one who strove for an ideal of decency or 
respectability.” Now one tried to “fit into the images found vividly all 
around him.”264 “The language of images is everywhere. Everywhere it has 
replaced the language of ideals.”265 
The growth of the service industries and an aggressive consumer 
ethos heightened the emphasis on pleasing images and first impressions. 
The expansion of the white-collar sector created conditions under which 
labor power took the form of personality rather than strength or intelligence, 
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and the service occupations placed on their participants intense 
requirements for managed self-presentation – in Goffman’s words, that 
“one give a perfectly homogeneous performance at every appointed 
time.”266 Advancement in the so-called corporate “rat race” was criticized 
as being little more than a series of superficial postures, bluffs, and 
confidence games.267 “The upwardly mobile organization man,” 
Christopher Lasch observed, “advances through the corporate ranks not by 
serving the organization but by convincing his associates that he has the 
attributes of a winner.”268  
The guiding theme of modern advertising was that everyone and 
everything had an image that could be sold to anyone if presented 
convincingly enough. As Boorstin noted, it was becoming a matter of faith 
that the right image could “elect a President or sell an automobile, a 
religion, a cigarette, or a suit of clothes.”269 Politicians’ increasing use of 
advertising techniques to generate popular support led Time magazine in 
1960 to dub that election cycle “The Year of the Image.”270 “When we talk 
about ourselves,” Boorstin wrote, “we talk about our images.”271 Ads 
encouraged consumers to view themselves with the critical gaze of 
spectators, as “performer[s] under the constant scrutiny of friends and 
strangers,”272 and to engage in self-appraisal and monitoring to reassure 
themselves of their “capacity to captivate or impress others.”273  
No development was more responsible for this apparent objectification 
of self than the introduction and cultural penetration of television.274 With 
its ubiquitous sitcoms and reality shows, television reinforced the 
intertwining of performance and real life and the idea of pleasing personal 
images as a source of success and approval. It trained Americans, from the 
youngest age, to be spectators and consumers of images. It also entrenched 
the culture and ethos of celebrity more deeply into the fabric of American 
life. In the postwar era, celebrity culture flourished, and it spread beyond 
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the realm of entertainment to virtually every other area of life, including 
politics, science, and academics.275 More than ever, the essence of fame and 
celebrity was style rather than substance. Whereas fame in earlier times had 
been tied to one’s achievements, modern celebrity rewarded those who 
projected a pleasing image and personality.276 Celebrities remained role 
models of self-presentation, and celebrity images, like other fragments of 
popular culture, were the inspiration and raw material from which many 
Americans constructed their own public identities and self-performances.277 
“The first art work,” Norman Mailer observed, is “the shaping of [one’s] 
own personality.”278  
 
2. My Image, Myself  
Many of these developments should be familiar to us, with their 
origins in the prewar period. There were, however, significant new trends 
that heightened the culture’s emphasis on personal image and image 
management. The postwar era saw the rise of what has been described as a 
“therapeutic culture” -- the popularization of psychology, particularly 
psychotherapeutic models, and psychological themes and concepts in mass 
culture.279 One effect of this was to enshrine an ideal of psychological 
perfectionism in popular thought. The basic idea was that the self was 
“broken” and that it needed to be reconstructed to achieve proper 
functioning. There was a particular obsession with diagnosis and 
rehabilitation, driven by the faith that psychic wholeness could be 
achieved.280  
With this cultural sensitivity to the emotions and to psychic injuries, 
the slights and insults of everyday life were increasingly categorized as 
assaults to the self and the psyche that produced deep and lasting 
pathologies. Sociologists described an increase in the number of people who 
identified a “psychogenic cause” for forms of personal discomfort and 
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dissatisfaction.281 Not only were mental health and illness reconceptualized, 
but happiness was more frequently defined in terms of psychological well-
being.282 As one historian has written, there was a “growing sense that 
social, economic, and physical problems are rooted within the psyche,” 
along with “rising expectations accompanying the belief that authenticity, 
emotional fulfillment, and self-actualization are preconditions for individual 
well-being.”283  
Essential to a healthy and functioning psyche, it was said, was the 
ability to express one’s inner self in one’s behavior and outward 
appearance. Self-expression was the antithesis of self-repression, which 
under the influence of the counterculture became associated with all things 
traditional, including the nuclear family, established religion, and the 
authority of the state. Hence the relative freedom with which people aired 
their thoughts, feelings, and desires before others, in talk shows, 
confessional writings, and in everyday conversation. With sexual and 
family matters no longer considered exclusively “private” and off-limits to 
public discussion, and emotional life freighted with new importance and 
meaning, we became a “tell all” society.284 By the 1970s, the ability to 
“express oneself,” free from the repressive constraints of traditional 
moralism, had come to be associated with the ideals of freedom and 
personal choice.285  
At some level, this self-expression ideal might appear to be a 
rejection of the formalities of self-presentation, self-monitoring, and self-
manipulation that were central to the cultures of celebrity and consumption, 
and the demands of modern bureaucracies, with their call for a standardized 
self and managed emotions. Yet it would also in many ways place greater 
demands on self-presentation. The essence of expressive freedom was self-
determination and the prerogative to shape one’s own public identity. It was 
not to abandon control over self-presentation, but rather to exert it, fully, 
freely and without hindrance. While the counterculture of this time may 
have widened the range of socially acceptable appearances and identities, 
the ideal of the expressive self nonetheless prized image management and 
the freedom to script one’s own public performance. Despite the rhetoric of 
personal liberation and an ethos of “let it all hang out,” there is every 
indication that Americans have become steadily more attentive to, and 
possessive of, their public images and appearances.  
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America had become a “republic of choice,” to use Lawrence 
Friedman’s term, one where “freedom” meant “being left alone by others, 
not having other people’s values, ideas, or styles of life forced upon one, 
being free of arbitrary authority in work, family, and political life.”286 The 
prerogative “to ‘be oneself’ [and] to choose oneself” was “placed in a 
special and privileged position.”287 Freedom of choice encompassed a right 
to freely select one’s activities, beliefs, and very identity from a variety of 
competing possibilities and options.288 The belief in the malleability of 
identity became more pervasive and deeply rooted as the erosion of strong 
interpersonal ties and social commitments hastened the decentering and 
destabilization of the self. An increasingly mobile population, broad access 
to differing ideas and worldviews, a wider range of personal relationships, 
and the decline of religious authority created the conditions where personal 
identity could be seen as fluid and subject to endless redesign.289 As the cast 
of significant others in one’s life became increasingly dispersed and 
variegated, and as cultural authorities lost their credibility, confidence faded 
in the “traditional concept of a bounded, integral self.”290 The widespread 
discussion of an “identity crisis” besieging modern Americans beginning in 
the 1960s revealed the prevailing belief that personal identity was unstable, 
shifting, elusive, and problematic, something that must be constantly 
created and recreated, manipulated and revised.291 By the latter 20th century, 
the modal self, according to sociologists and critics, had become a “pastiche 
personality,” “a social chameleon, constantly borrowing bits and pieces of 
identity from whatever sources are available and constructing them as 
useful or desirable in a given situation.”292 The “relatively coherent and 
unified sense of self” that had once existed gave way to “manifold and 
competing potentials.”293 
As the self came to be seen in terms of impressions and images – as 
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a collection of roles and performances, constructed and reconstructed in 
multiple contexts294 -- attacks on one’s ability to create his desired public 
image were regarded as assaults to personal autonomy and psychic 
integrity. And in a world of television, tabloid journalism, and a profusion 
of pictures in the visual environment, threats to personal image were 
everywhere. Popular journalism, seeking to whet the dulled appetites of an 
increasingly jaded and desensitized public, embarked on more 
sensationalistic and extreme depictions of individuals that were 
embarrassing and highly personal.295 As in the past, this included portrayals 
not only of celebrities and public figures but ordinary people unwittingly 
caught in the media spotlight.296 The more intense the public’s hunger for 
images and information about people, and the more sophisticated and 
complex the machineries of image-making, the more profound the 
possibilities for the tarnishing and fatal destabilization of one’s public 
persona.  
 
2. The Attack on Image and the Legal Counterattack   
Between the time William Prosser wrote his first torts treatise in the 
1940s and the 1970s, the number of privacy cases “escalated…even beyond 
his control.”297 Reported cases involving defamation, invasion of privacy, 
or emotional distress increased threefold in the 1970s,298 despite increasing 
free speech limitations on those torts.299 Popular culture registered a 
“fascination with libel and privacy suits.”300 Driven by their “devotion” to 
personal image and “seriousness about the inner self,” 301 in the words of 
libel scholar Rodney Smolla, those who felt that their reputations had been 
assaulted or their privacy invaded by the media appeared to be resorting 
increasingly to litigation.302  
 
1. Privacy  
Sensitivity to emotional and psychological injuries and a sense of 
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“rights-consciousness” led to increasing concerns with personal privacy and 
perceived threats to privacy.303 The concept of “privacy” came to be 
understood as not only the right to conceal the secret or intimate but the 
right “to exercise options in private behavior without adverse 
consequences.”304 In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Supreme Court 
described privacy as a right to make decisions about intimate life free from 
governmental interference, and it described privacy as a value protected by 
the “penumbras and emanations” of various guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights.305 Despite increasing legal and constitutional protections for 
privacy, privacy was regarded as being deeply imperiled by a variety of 
modern technologies and institutions, with the most threatening the mass 
media and the state.306  
These concerns with privacy, and increasing litigation in the area of 
tort privacy, led William Prosser to write his famous 1960 law review 
article Privacy. Prosser identified four distinct interests that had been 
protected by the privacy tort, and on this basis divided the privacy tort into 
four separate torts. The first, “intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or 
solitude,” concerned physical invasions of private space. The other three, 
which we have seen, implicated public image. Prosser described a “public 
disclosure of embarrassing private facts” tort; a “false light” tort, which 
involved “publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light before the 
public eye”; and an “appropriation” tort, which he described as a proprietary 
interest “in the exclusive use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness as an 
aspect of his identity.”307  
Prosser’s article had impact. The scholarly imprimatur legitimized 
the privacy tort and hastened its recognition in a number of states. Prosser’s 
typology would lead to the establishment in some states of four distinct 
causes of action in tort, under the general rubric of privacy.308 Two of 
Prosser’s four branches, appropriation and false light, developed 
substantially beginning in the 1960s. The rise of these torts reveals much 
about the nature of popular concerns with identity and image in this era, and 
courts’ willingness to shape the law to accommodate the values and 
priorities of the image society.  
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a. False light 
The most significant growth in tort privacy law came in the area that 
Prosser called “false light” privacy.309 In false light cases, one claimed an 
“invasion of privacy” when he was publicly presented in a context that was 
false or misleading and offensive.310 The false light action differed from the 
“public disclosure of private facts” branch of the privacy tort, in which the 
material presented was both humiliating and intimate. In a false light case, 
the facts disclosed need not be secret or “private” at all.311 Damages could 
be awarded for the emotional distress that came from being depicted in a 
manner that was embarrassing, misrepresentative, or otherwise unfavorable 
to the subject of the representation, even if benign or flattering in the eyes 
of others.312  
The 1950s and 60s saw a marked increase in false light cases, at a rate 
that far outpaced the “public disclosure” privacy cases.313 The “false light” 
route to recovery was desirable for plaintiffs because it did not require that 
the statement be disparaging or harm one’s reputation,314 and compensation 
for emotional harms could be awarded without proof of special damages, as 
was the rule in certain classes of libel cases.315 As Prosser noted, because of 
its broad scope, false light had “no doubt [had] succeeded in affording a … 
remedy in a good many instances not covered by [defamation].”316 The 
tort’s expansive reach spurred a range of image-based claims from the 
serious to the “shabby and exploitative,” in the words of Harry Kalven, 
Jr.317 One false light plaintiff claimed that a photograph of his home 
published in a newspaper accompanied by caption referring to the home as 
a “bit weatherworn and unkempt” depicted him in a false light and was thus 
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an invasion of privacy.318 A stripper brought suit for false light when she 
was described in a newspaper under the stage name “Dawn Darling,” rather 
than her real stage name, “Charming Charmaine De Aire.”319 Another noted 
case involved plaintiffs, youths backpacking in Europe, who sued under 
false light when Time magazine described them as “disenchanted” young 
nomads.320  
To be actionable, the “falsity” of a false light representation had to be 
offensive to the reasonable person.321 Offensiveness was a vague and 
elusive term.322 In its most expansive interpretation, an offensive 
publication was one that made its subject uncomfortable. In Cantrell v 
Forest City Publishing, the Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict awarding 
damages for false light invasion of privacy for a publication that asserted 
that a recently widowed mother was living in poverty as a result of her 
husband’s death in a construction accident. The portrayal was not inaccurate 
and did not defame her, but it caused her distress by publicizing her and 
subjecting her to sympathy she did not want, making the family an “object 
of pity and ridicule.”323 In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court held that an 
inaccurate depiction of a family held hostage in its home by attackers could 
be actionable as an invasion of privacy, even though it portrayed the family 
in a manner that was favorable and heroic.324 
The false light tort was initially met with much acclaim by the courts 
and the legal academy. Many believed it would offer the protection for the 
image and the emotions that libel law had proven inadequate to provide.325 
Edward Bloustein believed that the development of “false light,” with its 
protection of individual “dignity,” “may provide a valuable avenue or 
development for the law of defamation.”326 False light privacy and 
defamation, predicted one writer, would converge to create “a single, 
integrated system of protecting plaintiff’s peace of mind against acts of the 
defendant intended to disturb it.”327 At the same time, there were concerns 
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with false light’s implications for freedom of speech and press; critics 
attacked the vague offensiveness standard, the fact that recovery could be 
obtained without a showing of any real injury,328 and that false light lacked 
the many of the common law safeguards that had balanced defamation law 
with freedom of speech, such as the defense of truth.329 Prosser feared that 
false light was “swallowing up” defamation, at the expense of freedom of 
speech and press.330 “If the statement is not offensive enough to the 
reasonable man to be defamatory,” Kalven asked in 1966, “how would it be 
an invasion of privacy?”331 In 1967, Time, Inc. v. Hill imported the New 
York Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard to the false light privacy 
domain,332 but the tort remained problematic to many from a First 
Amendment perspective. There was a movement against false light 
beginning in the 1980s, leading to its rejection in several states.333  
The false light tort is nonetheless very much alive.334 It persists as the 
expression of the deeply rooted belief that there is something objectionable 
and potentially injurious about being publicized in a way that clashes with 
one’s own self-image, and that all should have a right to “choose those 
portions of the individual which are to be made public” as a matter of 
“human dignity and independence.”335 The false light tort was necessary 
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protection against the “distortion of self-image” caused by an inaccurate or 
undesirable depiction, which “impinged on a person’s individuality.”336 In a 
false light action, “the defendant’s falsehood brings about a mismatch or 
conflict between the plaintiff’s actual identity and his identity in the minds 
of others, a conflict that itself can be offensive or disorienting,” observed 
Gary Schwartz.337 By depicting a person in a way that veered sharply from 
her own self-image, false light statements “impugn[ed] or confound[ed] the 
individual’s identity in society” and imperiled “his sense of self.”338 
 
b. Appropriation 
In the immediate postwar era, as we have seen, courts began to 
recognize the appropriation branch of the privacy tort, described in some 
states as a “right of publicity.”339 As the Supreme Court defined it in 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, the right of publicity was a 
broad right to “personal control over commercial exploitation of [one’s] 
personality.”340 It was also described as a right to control the uses of one’s 
“identity.”341 By the 1970s, it was well-established that individuals, both 
celebrities and noncelebrities, had a right to control the economic value of 
their images and to recover lost profits from the unauthorized commercial 
use of their images.342 The number of right of publicity cases brought 
during the 1980s tripled that of two decades earlier, and several states 
passed anti-appropriation statutes.343  
In many jurisdictions, the right of publicity was regarded as a right 
of property rather than a right of privacy, although some treated it as an 
aspect of privacy -- a dignitary right with property-like aspects.344 This 
hybrid basis of the right of publicity was an apt reflection of popular 
conceptions of personal image at the time. To lose control of one’s image 
was regarded as a dignitary affront, yet with one’s public image seen as a 
conscious and self-willed creation, it also represented the loss of something 
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tangible and material. An oft-cited justification for a right to recover the 
economic value of one’s image was that a person had expended labor in its 
creation.345 While the right of publicity had been initially construed as 
protection for one’s photograph, name, and likeness, it was expanded to 
cover a variety of personal attributes, such as one’s voice, gestures, and 
manner of dress. Thus it was that Jackie Kennedy Onassis persuaded a court 
to block look-alike images of her in advertisements; the estate of Elvis 
Presley convinced a court to ban Elvis impersonators, and Bette Midler 
recovered for an imitation of her voice in a commercial.346 Such was the 
logic of the image culture: any invocation or use of an individual’s looks or 
persona, however superficial or contrived that persona might be, constituted 
the exploitation of one’s “identity.”347  
Most right of publicity claims were brought by celebrities, whose 
images had obvious and usually quantifiable value.348 The right of publicity 
was not limited to celebrities, however -- a person had a right of publicity in 
her image if it had any conceivable commercial value. By the 1970s, 
noncelebrities increasingly brought lawsuits to recover the economic value 
of their images.349 As advertisers and publishers, in their quest for images, 
continued to make use of the faces, figures, and features of average people, 
individuals of all backgrounds came to realize the profit-generating 
potential of their images, however humble they might be. In 1967, a 
recently returned veteran whose picture had been used in a real estate ad 
without his consent successfully sued to recover the commercial value of 
his image.350 A court held that a construction worker had stated a valid 
claim for appropriation when footage of him installing tile was used in a 
television commercial.351 A woman brought suit for the value of her nude 
silhouette when a photographer took a picture of her when she was bathing 
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naked in a stream with her child; the picture was subsequently used in an 
ad.352 Without embarrassment or moral hesitation, ordinary men and women 
asserted that they had a right to control their images that included extracting 
from them maximum value. 
The First Amendment implications of the right of publicity were 
debated, and free speech limitations were placed on the right, to prevent it 
from impairing the circulation of “news” or information on “matters of 
public concern.”353 Within the legal academy, the labor theory of identity 
came under attack; scholars questioned whether a celebrity image truly 
reflected the effort of the star or the interpretive work of audiences who 
ascribed meaning to it.354 In the realm of popular thought, this postmodern 
theory of image appears to have had little impact; in a culture of choice and 
individualism, it was widely believed that one was solely responsible for the 
creation of one’s image, and that one should therefore control all uses of 
it.355 Unlike the image torts that protected dignitary and emotional interests, 
which were plagued by ongoing doubts about spurious claims, the right to 
commercially exploit one’s image was virtually unquestioned. If there was 
any certainty in privacy law, two privacy scholars noted in 1974, it was in 
the area of appropriation.356  
 
2. Infliction of Emotional Distress 
By the 1960s, in most states, intentional infliction of severe 
emotional distress had been recognized as an independent tort.357 To 
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recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, that 
the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, that the defendant’s conduct 
caused emotional distress, and that the distress was severe.358 A cause of 
action could occur where emotional disturbance resulted from upsetting or 
insulting language “including threats, false statements, and language that 
was insulting, humiliating, scandalous, violent, or abusive.”359 The 
emotional disturbance need not cause a physical reaction, but it had to be 
serious enough to cause physical consequences, even if they did not actually 
ensue.360  
Emotional distress cases began to be brought against the media, part 
of a broader wave of anti-press litigation.361 In some emotional distress 
cases brought over upsetting publications, the alleged harm was shock or 
fright, as when a newspaper falsely reported a death or startling medical 
diagnosis of which the plaintiff was unaware.362 A number of emotional 
distress cases against the media involved image-based harms. As with false 
light privacy, the plaintiff claimed to have been injured when presented 
before the public in a way that was humiliating, misrepresentative, or 
insulting. In these cases, the emotional distress tort was often used as a “gap 
filler” in the law of image, a route to compensation when the requirements 
of privacy and defamation could not be met, or as an additional source of 
recovery to be combined with privacy and libel.363 The tort came of age 
when a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a 
$200,000 judgment for Reverend Jerry Falwell for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress over the publication of an “ad parody” in Hustler 
magazine imputing to him egregious sexual conduct. It was ultimately 
reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court364 in a decision that applied the actual 
malice requirement to the emotional distress tort when it involved public 
officials and public figures.365 
Though some of the challenged depictions could be seen as 
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legitimately offensive, as when a newspaper falsely depicted the plaintiff as 
a prostitute,366 others were unlikely to be viewed by the public as either 
particularly thoughtless or insensitive.367 A woman sued a paper over 
emotional distress when it printed a photograph that made her appear 
stout.368 A man brought an emotional distress claim over a five second film 
clip that depicted him and his female co-worker holding hands on a public 
street.369 In one case, intentional infliction of emotional distress was alleged 
when a newspaper graphically described efforts to save the plaintiff’s wife’s 
life in an emergency room.370 One claim resulted from plaintiffs being 
described as litigious in a newspaper article.371 As one legal scholar 
observed, many of the portrayals at issue in emotional distress cases against 
the media were “clearly not intrusive, false, or defamatory” but were 
nonetheless disturbing “to the specific individuals involved.”372 The 
willingness of courts and juries to award damages in such cases despite 
First Amendment limitations indicates that the public regards such harms to 
one’s image and one’s feelings about one’s image as legitimate and 
“real.”373 
 
3. Libel  
The entrance of television into the news and entertainment fields 
and the rise of investigative journalism and tabloid journalism in the 1950s 
and 60s led to heightened media sensationalism, which attracted audiences 
and at the same time produced a popular backlash.374 There was an 
observable animus against the press and a widespread feeling that it was 
abusing its freedom by invading privacy and playing havoc with the 
reputations and images of both public and private figures.375 One 
                                                
366 See, e.g., Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, 572 F. Supp. 909 (Wisc. 1983).  
367 Drechsel, Intentional Infliction at 356.  
368 McManamon v. Daily Freeman, 6 Media L. Rep. 2245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). See 
also Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619 (Fla App. 1982) (spouse of deceased airline pilot sued 
when book described deceased as ghost who had appeared on several airline flights); Hood 
v. Naeter Bros. Pub. Co., 562 S.W. 2d 770 (alleging outrageous conduct in the publishing 
of plaintiff’s name as sole witness to a murder); Fudge v. Penthouse Intern. Ltd., 840 F. 2d. 
1012 (1st Cir. 1988); Grimsley v. Guccione, 703 F. Supp. 903 (M.D Ala. 1988); Lambert v. 
Garlo, 19 Ohio App. 3d. 295; Holtzcheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, 306 S.C. 297.   
369 De Gregorio v. CBS, 123 Misc. 2d. 491 (N.Y. Sup. 1984).  
370 Reichenbach v. Call-Chronicle, 9 Media L. Rep. 1438 (Common Pleas Pa. 1982).  
371 Rutledge v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 148 Ariz. 555 (Ariz. 1986).  
372 See Drechsel, Intentional Infliction, at 361. 
373 See Ross v. Burns, 612 F. 2d. 271 (6th Cir. 1980); Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F. 2d. 1270 
(4th Cir. 1986); Cape Publication v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d. 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).  
374 See e.g., John Morton, Feeling Readers’ Tabloid Appetites, AM. JOURNALISM REV., 
Sept. 1994;  
375 ROSENBERG, supra at 247; Mead, infra at 60; Ignaz Rothenberg, Invasion of 
60 The Laws of Image  
consequence was a marked increase in libel suits and damage awards in 
cases against the press.376 Commentators observed the “vicarious 
satisfaction” of juries “in helping a libel case plaintiff to the pot of gold at 
the end of the rainbow,” particularly when the defendant was a major media 
outlet. 377  
To many, libel law was not enough. Critics alleged that the 
complexities of libel doctrine, bogged down in the technicalities of the legal 
concept of “reputation,” made libel inadequate to redress the potential 
harms to the psyche and feelings caused by media misrepresentations. In 
1962, Walter Probert argued that defamation should be reconceived a 
“personality tort,” one that focused less on injury to “reputation” than on 
harm to one’s self-image and emotions. The victims of defamatory 
statements suffered, even more than injury to their relationships, hurt 
feelings, low self-esteem, and “psychiatric concerns.”378 “Such factors,” he 
wrote, “should weigh just as heavily psychologically with the 
decisionmaker as does the inference of likelihood of harm to reputation.”379 
In the vein of Burton v. Crowell, courts continued to expand the definition 
of a defamatory publication to include representations that were not harmful 
to a person’s external social relations but that were nonetheless injurious to 
his feelings about his image.380  In 1964, Edward Bloustein noted an 
“increasing tendency” in the law of defamation to go “beyond the 
traditional reaches” of the protection of reputation to include the “personal 
humiliation and degradation” that came from unfavorable media 
depictions.381 Harry Kalven, Jr. observed that courts were “assimilat[ing] 
defamation cases to privacy.”382  
The law moved even more squarely in that direction in the two 
decades following New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964. Sullivan, which 
grew out of reporting on the civil rights movement, expressed the 
countervailing movement of the image society -- towards greater freedom to 
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make and circulate images, more expansive rights of speech and press. 
While the postwar era saw the growth of the image torts, it also witnessed a 
movement in favor of expressive freedom, both in formal law and in 
cultural attitudes more generally. The guiding faith of the counterculture 
had been the importance of free expression to participatory democracy, and 
Sullivan celebrated the virtues of “uninhibited, robust, and wide open” 
public discourse, including representations of authorities and public 
officials that were caustic and even false.383 After Sullivan, which 
constitutionalized libel law, all public figure libel plaintiffs must prove that 
the offending statement was actually false as a precondition to recovery, 
and that it was published with reckless disregard of the truth.384 The 
Supreme Court would later extend the Sullivan First Amendment 
requirements to libel cases involving private figure plaintiffs, who were 
required to show that the material was false and published at least 
negligently.385  
Contrary to what is often assumed, Sullivan and its progeny did not 
dissuade libel suits and large judgments against the press.386 Cultural 
attitudes may have had a stronger influence on the direction of the law than 
formal doctrinal changes; the image-consciousness sensibility propelled an 
increasing number of libel suits in the 1970s and 80s and greater jury 
sympathy towards libel plaintiffs, Sullivan notwithstanding.387 It is possible 
that New York Times v. Sullivan was itself responsible for an increase in 
libel litigation and damage awards. Public dissatisfaction with the media 
and the feeling that publishers were acquiring too many First Amendment 
freedoms may have contributed to the rise of the libel “megaverdict,” a 
judgment of more than one million dollars beginning in the 1970s.388  
As a doctrinal matter, Sullivan intensified libel law’s focus on self-
image and emotional harms. The common law’s focus had been on 
reputational injuries; proof of reputational harm had been a precondition for 
recovery for emotional harm, although courts began to veer from that rule 
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beginning in the 1930s, as discussed.389 The Sullivan line of cases moved 
the focus of the tort further away from the protection of the individual’s 
reputation and more towards the falsity of the statement and the individual’s 
ensuing emotional distress.390 In Gertz v. Robert Welch (1974), in which the 
court added further First Amendment limitations to the defamation action, 
the Supreme Court held that compensatory damages in libel cases, including 
damages for emotional harm, could be awarded without demonstrating any 
injury to reputation. The plaintiff could simply show “personal humiliation 
and mental anguish and suffering.”391  
Libel law, as the other image torts, became a means to vindicate 
perceived slights to one’s image regardless of the actual impact on public 
opinion. The focus of the action, in many cases, is the “decline in self-
reputation” suffered by the plaintiff.392 The bulk of the money paid out in 
damage awards in defamation suits goes to “compensate for psychic injury, 
rather than any objectively verifiable damage to one’s reputation.”393 As 
Randall Bezanson has noted, reputation has come to mean freedom from 
emotional distress caused by a false depiction,394 and harm occurs from 
“being the subject of a false representation which the subject feels strongly 
enough about to sue.”395 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The rise of tort image law and litigation was not only a function of 
taking images seriously. It was also a product of the legalization of image, 
in the sense that Americans came to regard their public images and the 
construction of their images as proper matters for legal intervention and 
supervision. This was part of a larger movement towards the penetration of 
the law into virtually all areas of public and especially private life.396 Over 
the 20th century, the law made its presence known in a variety of domains 
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previously untouched by it, including the intimate, familiar, intangible, and 
personal. Domestic relations, sexual life, and the problems and complexities 
of the emotions and the psyche came to be viewed as legal affairs; rather 
than traditional social institutions, the legal system was coming to be 
regarded as the proper outlet for a range of personal grievances.397 By the 
latter part of the century, there was a tendency to understand individual 
“problems and social troubles” in terms of “legal rights and obligations,”398 
and fewer “zones” of legal immunity and barriers to litigation.399 One 
byproduct of the legalization of everyday life, as Lawrence Friedman has 
written, was a “general expectation of justice.” “As an aspect of twentieth 
century legal culture, people have come to expect justice -- in the form of 
compensation or reparation -- whenever they suffer harm or calamity which 
is not their fault.”400 This expectation, I have suggested, extended to the 
realm of image. 
In this article I have made claims about the significance of personal 
image, broadly defined, in American society, and the role of images in 
social relations and views of the modern self. I have defined image as a 
representation of self that overlaps with reputation, yet is distinct from it. 
Reputation is a form of social appraisal that is generally based on 
interpersonal contact and perceptions accrued over time; images are 
transient, superficial, and impressionistic. We have been -- and still are -- 
concerned with our reputations, but we have also learned to see ourselves in 
terms of images. We are concerned not only with how we appear before the 
public, but perhaps even more, how we feel about our images, and whether 
our public images match our idealized self-images.  
In the twentieth century, the image industries, an intense 
individualism in popular thought and culture, the perceived congruence of 
image and identity, and threats to personal image from the mass media led 
Americans to place increasing emphasis on their images and to cultivate a 
particular possessiveness towards them. The legal expression of this 
sensibility was the image torts. I have correlated image-consciousness in 
modern American culture with the evolution of a series of tort actions to 
protect the perceived right to control one’s image and to the phenomenon of 
the personal image lawsuit. Throughout, I have tried to stress the 
particularly democratic nature of American image rights. Unlike many 
European countries, where concerns with public image have traditionally 
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been a preoccupation of the elite, Americans of all backgrounds have long 
expressed an interest in controlling their images, to which the law has 
responded.401 The average person’s image-consciousness may be a 
consequence, in part, of the relatively fluid class structure in this country; in 
a culture that has held out the possibility of social advance through self-
transformation, particularly through changes in external conduct and 
appearance, for every person, regardless of station, personal image is seen 
as really worth something.  
The focus of this work has been the impact of culture on formal law, 
but the opposite influence is also worth considering. Judicial and legislative 
recognition of a right to one’s image likely validated such a right, not only 
as a matter of law but also as a matter of popular faith. In deciding whether 
or not to grant recovery for libels or invasions of privacy, courts and juries 
envisioned a “reasonable person” with respect to image. This modal self 
was often construed as a highly image-conscious being: intently concerned 
with his public appearance and reputation and likely to be hurt, perhaps 
quite severely, by false or undesirable depictions. The law affirmed the 
image-conscious sensibility, and in this way helped shape individuals’ 
conceptions of personal identity and the texture of modern social relations. 
The story I have told is one of steadily increasing legal protections 
for personal image, and at the same time, substantial resistance to that 
movement. The rise of the image society led to a possessiveness towards 
personal image and also to the liberation of images—a proliferation of 
images in the public sphere. Freedom of speech has been understood as the 
freedom to image -- to circulate representations of individuals and ideas that 
are upsetting, shocking, controversial, and humiliating. The dominant 
narrative in the legal scholarship has been the story of the “triumph” of the 
First Amendment over the right to control one’s own public image.402 What 
is less often acknowledged, and what I have tried to account for, is how the 
reach and scope of the image torts have continued to expand despite –or 
perhaps even because of – those free speech limitations. 
The digital age has initiated a new chapter in the history of personal 
image and the law, one that continues to register many of the themes and 
influences of earlier times but that is also distinct. The internet has flooded 
the world with images and created a social universe structured around 
relationships mediated by superficial impressions and contacts. Our 
identities are increasingly a function of the images and personae we present 
online. The faceless and often anonymous quality of online interaction 
permits us to create multiple “selves”–a Facebook self, a professional 
identity, and so on – leading the to further fragmentation of personal 
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identity and social experience. As the outcry around online privacy 
suggests,403 we perceive a legal right – a “privacy” right -- to maintain these 
various digital selves, however ephemeral and superficial they might be. 
We are not hesitant to use the web to create and disseminate images to an 
unprecedented mass audience, and if the steady stream of defamation and 
privacy lawsuits related to internet activities are any indication, we are 
equally unhesitant to mobilize the law when the internet’s image-making 
properties are turned against us. 404  
What I have said in this article has not been intended as a critique of 
Americans as unnecessarily sensitive, superficial, or litigious, though this 
may sometimes be the case. I have not meant to trivialize or minimize the 
emotional and psychic harms that can be caused by humiliating public 
representations of individuals, particularly when they are circulated through 
the channels of mass communications. The point of this work is not to say 
whether image-consciousness is good or bad. It is merely to point out that it 
exists, that it has been present in our legal and social traditions for quite 
some time now. The values of the image society have permeated the law, 
and there appears to be no turning back.  
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